1 00:00:01,040 --> 00:00:03,096 Good morning , everyone listening in 2 00:00:03,096 --> 00:00:05,096 Washington , around the country and 3 00:00:05,096 --> 00:00:07,318 around the world , I'm Michael handling 4 00:00:07,318 --> 00:00:09,484 with the foreign policy program at the 5 00:00:09,484 --> 00:00:09,240 Brookings Institution . Today we are 6 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:11,240 honored the host , the secretary of 7 00:00:11,240 --> 00:00:13,380 defense , Mark Esper , who , after 8 00:00:13,380 --> 00:00:15,269 being introduced by my boss , the 9 00:00:15,269 --> 00:00:17,380 president , Brookings retired General 10 00:00:17,380 --> 00:00:19,602 John Allen , will offer some remarks on 11 00:00:19,602 --> 00:00:21,824 how Kobe , 19 is affecting the American 12 00:00:21,824 --> 00:00:23,824 armed forces and anything else that 13 00:00:23,824 --> 00:00:25,880 you'd like to begin the conversation 14 00:00:25,880 --> 00:00:28,213 with . Then I'll ask him some questions . 15 00:00:28,213 --> 00:00:30,380 And then we'll hear from you with your 16 00:00:30,380 --> 00:00:32,491 questions that if you haven't already 17 00:00:32,491 --> 00:00:34,491 submitted , you're welcome to do so 18 00:00:34,491 --> 00:00:36,491 through the events at brookings dot 19 00:00:36,491 --> 00:00:38,713 either you email address with apologies 20 00:00:38,713 --> 00:00:40,769 that we may not get to all of them . 21 00:00:40,769 --> 00:00:43,047 But again , events at Brookings Scotty , 22 00:00:43,047 --> 00:00:45,213 do you ? And without further ado , let 23 00:00:45,213 --> 00:00:47,102 me and the baton to John Allen to 24 00:00:47,102 --> 00:00:49,160 introduce Secretary esperan if you 25 00:00:49,160 --> 00:00:51,620 might appreciate it . Good morning , 26 00:00:51,620 --> 00:00:53,787 ladies and gentlemen . My name is John 27 00:00:53,787 --> 00:00:55,842 Allen , and I'm the president of the 28 00:00:55,842 --> 00:00:57,898 Brookings Institution , and it is my 29 00:00:57,898 --> 00:01:00,120 very great privilege to welcome you all 30 00:01:00,120 --> 00:01:02,287 to today's event featuring our honored 31 00:01:02,287 --> 00:01:04,509 guest , the US Secretary Defense Doctor 32 00:01:04,509 --> 00:01:08,210 Marty , secretary effort was for end 33 00:01:08,220 --> 00:01:12,080 is the 27th secretary of defense on 23 34 00:01:12,080 --> 00:01:15,520 July 2019 . And he had served as the 35 00:01:15,520 --> 00:01:17,880 acting secretary in June and July of 36 00:01:17,880 --> 00:01:20,540 that year , but also served as the 37 00:01:20,540 --> 00:01:23,070 secretary of the Army from 20 November 38 00:01:23,210 --> 00:01:26,250 2017 to the summer of 2019 . 39 00:01:27,340 --> 00:01:29,960 The secretary , Esper is no stranger to 40 00:01:29,960 --> 00:01:32,870 service . He's the 1986 West Point 41 00:01:32,870 --> 00:01:35,570 graduate and upon graduation was 42 00:01:35,570 --> 00:01:37,570 commissioned in the infantry and Mr 43 00:01:37,570 --> 00:01:39,570 Secretary , that makes at least two 44 00:01:39,570 --> 00:01:41,348 infantryman on this call . Ah , 45 00:01:41,348 --> 00:01:43,720 completion of who , uh Upon completion 46 00:01:43,720 --> 00:01:45,970 of Ranger and Pathfinder training . He 47 00:01:45,970 --> 00:01:48,380 served in the 101st Airborne Division 48 00:01:48,390 --> 00:01:52,170 Marisol and participated in the 1990 91 49 00:01:52,170 --> 00:01:54,980 Gulf War with the cherished Screaming 50 00:01:54,980 --> 00:01:57,440 eagles . He later commanded a rifle 51 00:01:57,440 --> 00:02:00,190 company in the 33 to 5 Airborne 52 00:02:00,190 --> 00:02:03,270 Battalion combat team in Vincenza , 53 00:02:03,270 --> 00:02:05,540 Italy , retired from the U . S . Army 54 00:02:05,540 --> 00:02:08,340 in 2007 after spending 10 years on 55 00:02:08,340 --> 00:02:11,090 active duty and 11 years with the Guard 56 00:02:11,090 --> 00:02:13,880 and Reserve . For much of the decade 57 00:02:13,880 --> 00:02:15,658 that followed , Secretary Esper 58 00:02:15,658 --> 00:02:17,880 continued his service in and around the 59 00:02:17,880 --> 00:02:20,250 government , notably for Secretary 60 00:02:20,260 --> 00:02:22,900 Chuck Hagel , former Senate Majority 61 00:02:22,900 --> 00:02:25,190 Leader Bill Frist and as the deputy 62 00:02:25,190 --> 00:02:27,246 assistant secretary of Defense . for 63 00:02:27,246 --> 00:02:29,480 negotiations policy under President 64 00:02:29,490 --> 00:02:32,060 George W . Bush . He would then go on 65 00:02:32,060 --> 00:02:33,893 to a distinguished career in our 66 00:02:33,893 --> 00:02:35,750 defense industry , most recently 67 00:02:35,750 --> 00:02:37,583 serving as the vice president of 68 00:02:37,583 --> 00:02:40,940 government relations for Razia . Mr . 69 00:02:40,940 --> 00:02:43,051 Secretary , on behalf of all of us at 70 00:02:43,051 --> 00:02:45,162 the Brookings Institution , we are so 71 00:02:45,162 --> 00:02:47,051 honored to host you today to this 72 00:02:47,051 --> 00:02:48,718 crucial online conversation , 73 00:02:49,000 --> 00:02:51,790 especially given the ongoing Cove in 19 74 00:02:51,790 --> 00:02:53,960 Crisis . Yours is one of the most 75 00:02:53,960 --> 00:02:56,293 important roles in our government today , 76 00:02:56,293 --> 00:02:58,349 and we thank you for all that you're 77 00:02:58,349 --> 00:03:00,349 doing to keep us safe . Let me also 78 00:03:00,349 --> 00:03:02,071 commend you , sir , for making 79 00:03:02,071 --> 00:03:03,904 artificial intelligence and tech 80 00:03:03,904 --> 00:03:06,020 modernization key priorities for our 81 00:03:06,150 --> 00:03:08,110 Department of Defense . This is an 82 00:03:08,110 --> 00:03:10,660 issue of utmost significance who 83 00:03:10,660 --> 00:03:13,870 include Brookings as we struggle to 84 00:03:13,870 --> 00:03:16,090 ensure that we maintain our precedence 85 00:03:16,090 --> 00:03:18,550 and preeminence in these areas around 86 00:03:18,550 --> 00:03:21,020 the world . Now moving to today's 87 00:03:21,020 --> 00:03:23,140 events . Once I have completed my 88 00:03:23,140 --> 00:03:25,307 remarks , Secretary s for will provide 89 00:03:25,307 --> 00:03:27,418 his own . Then we'll be joined in the 90 00:03:27,418 --> 00:03:29,640 conversation by Brookings senior fellow 91 00:03:29,640 --> 00:03:31,696 Michael Hanlin , who will also field 92 00:03:31,696 --> 00:03:33,530 questions from you via the email 93 00:03:33,530 --> 00:03:37,320 address events at brookings dot edu or 94 00:03:37,320 --> 00:03:39,153 by joining the conversation over 95 00:03:39,153 --> 00:03:42,450 Twitter at hashtag sec def and one 96 00:03:42,450 --> 00:03:45,150 final personal notes there . Uh , we 97 00:03:45,150 --> 00:03:47,400 know that you are theoretically neutral 98 00:03:47,410 --> 00:03:49,760 on this issue , but speaking for the 99 00:03:49,780 --> 00:03:51,947 Annapolis graduates , probably on this 100 00:03:51,947 --> 00:03:54,530 line , we are looking forward to your 101 00:03:54,530 --> 00:03:56,752 making happen at the end of this year . 102 00:03:56,752 --> 00:03:59,930 America's football game or cadets in 103 00:03:59,930 --> 00:04:02,097 the brigade of midshipmen . It will be 104 00:04:02,097 --> 00:04:04,263 an important moment in the recovery of 105 00:04:04,263 --> 00:04:06,486 this country . And to brings of late in 106 00:04:06,486 --> 00:04:08,541 the darkness that we've been we have 107 00:04:08,541 --> 00:04:10,430 been experiencing . I know you're 108 00:04:10,430 --> 00:04:12,486 theoretically neutral , so I'll just 109 00:04:12,486 --> 00:04:15,670 say Go Navy and Go Army Over to you , 110 00:04:15,670 --> 00:04:17,880 sir . Thank you . Great . Well , thank 111 00:04:17,880 --> 00:04:19,991 you very much , general . And so good 112 00:04:19,991 --> 00:04:22,213 to see you again . And thank you . Also 113 00:04:22,213 --> 00:04:24,158 for that kind introduction and for 114 00:04:24,158 --> 00:04:26,047 hosting the me this morning . And 115 00:04:26,047 --> 00:04:28,102 Michael Hamlin . Thank you . Good to 116 00:04:28,102 --> 00:04:30,213 see you again . It's great to be here 117 00:04:30,213 --> 00:04:32,269 today with you and Brookings to talk 118 00:04:32,269 --> 00:04:34,380 about the impact of Cove in 19 on the 119 00:04:34,380 --> 00:04:36,436 department defense and the way ahead 120 00:04:36,436 --> 00:04:38,491 for the Pentagon and for the force . 121 00:04:38,491 --> 00:04:40,713 You know , I'm very proud of what d o . 122 00:04:40,713 --> 00:04:42,880 D . Has accomplished in the few months 123 00:04:42,880 --> 00:04:44,880 that we've been tackling Cove in 19 124 00:04:44,880 --> 00:04:47,047 since , uh , since late January , when 125 00:04:47,047 --> 00:04:49,269 I first issued my guidance to the force 126 00:04:49,269 --> 00:04:51,324 with regard protection . And then on 127 00:04:51,324 --> 00:04:53,324 February 1st , when we activate our 128 00:04:53,324 --> 00:04:55,436 global pandemic plan , we've remained 129 00:04:55,436 --> 00:04:57,602 ahead of the curve at every turn . And 130 00:04:57,602 --> 00:04:59,658 I'm very proud of what we've done at 131 00:04:59,658 --> 00:05:01,880 this point time as we start to see some 132 00:05:01,880 --> 00:05:03,824 light at the end . The tunnel . We 133 00:05:03,824 --> 00:05:05,936 currently have 62,000 service members 134 00:05:05,936 --> 00:05:07,936 deployed across all 50 states , the 135 00:05:07,936 --> 00:05:07,830 territories and the District of 136 00:05:07,830 --> 00:05:10,580 Columbia . Of them , 45,000 National 137 00:05:10,580 --> 00:05:12,636 Guardsmen are active in every single 138 00:05:12,636 --> 00:05:14,830 state , performing a wide range of 139 00:05:14,830 --> 00:05:16,886 tasks . We have thousands of medical 140 00:05:16,886 --> 00:05:19,110 professionals doctors , nurses , 141 00:05:19,110 --> 00:05:21,670 respiratory therapists , others who are 142 00:05:21,670 --> 00:05:23,614 out on the front lines on our Army 143 00:05:23,614 --> 00:05:25,726 Corps of Engineers , with nearly 2000 144 00:05:25,726 --> 00:05:27,837 folks deployed , have been out in the 145 00:05:27,837 --> 00:05:30,059 streets of America , expanding capacity 146 00:05:30,059 --> 00:05:31,948 in some of our largest cities and 147 00:05:31,948 --> 00:05:34,114 working with governors in every single 148 00:05:34,114 --> 00:05:33,920 state . So I'm very proud of what the 149 00:05:33,920 --> 00:05:36,142 team has done . Aziz , you know , we've 150 00:05:36,142 --> 00:05:37,976 recently deployed redeployed the 151 00:05:37,976 --> 00:05:39,642 comfort back to Norfolk after 152 00:05:39,642 --> 00:05:41,809 performing a multi week mission in New 153 00:05:41,809 --> 00:05:43,976 York City , and I think the mercy will 154 00:05:43,976 --> 00:05:45,920 soon depart from California in the 155 00:05:45,920 --> 00:05:48,142 coming weeks . We have also at the same 156 00:05:48,142 --> 00:05:50,142 time reached out to our friends and 157 00:05:50,142 --> 00:05:52,142 allies . I've spoken to many of our 158 00:05:52,142 --> 00:05:54,087 partners , many of my colleagues , 159 00:05:54,087 --> 00:05:56,031 about what we could share , how it 160 00:05:56,031 --> 00:05:55,760 could help them , the supplies we 161 00:05:55,760 --> 00:05:57,760 provide them . So we also recognize 162 00:05:57,890 --> 00:05:59,779 that during this time of crisis , 163 00:05:59,779 --> 00:06:02,001 internal to the country , we still have 164 00:06:02,001 --> 00:06:04,001 and rely upon friends and allies to 165 00:06:04,001 --> 00:06:06,168 that point . We also very cognizant of 166 00:06:06,168 --> 00:06:08,223 the threats that we face outside our 167 00:06:08,223 --> 00:06:10,446 borders . We remain as sentinels on the 168 00:06:10,446 --> 00:06:12,334 guard , the United States . As we 169 00:06:12,334 --> 00:06:14,446 watched , we've seen Chinese activity 170 00:06:14,446 --> 00:06:16,668 pick up in the South China Sea . We see 171 00:06:16,668 --> 00:06:18,834 the Russians continue to probe our air 172 00:06:18,834 --> 00:06:21,080 space outside of Alaska and in the 173 00:06:21,080 --> 00:06:23,440 northern frontier . We see militia 174 00:06:23,440 --> 00:06:27,000 groups busy in Iraq , uh , terrorists 175 00:06:27,080 --> 00:06:29,302 active from Africa , through the Middle 176 00:06:29,302 --> 00:06:31,990 East into Afghanistan and it all points 177 00:06:31,990 --> 00:06:34,470 in turn . We are side by side with our 178 00:06:34,470 --> 00:06:37,660 partners and allies . Just recently , 179 00:06:37,660 --> 00:06:40,750 we had a defense ministerial with our 180 00:06:40,750 --> 00:06:43,320 NATO partners and had a good discussion 181 00:06:43,320 --> 00:06:45,431 about how NATO can and should respond 182 00:06:45,570 --> 00:06:47,792 to the Corona virus . Some very pleased 183 00:06:47,792 --> 00:06:49,880 with what is happening . That said , 184 00:06:49,880 --> 00:06:52,000 we're very cognizant of the impacts 185 00:06:52,000 --> 00:06:54,111 that we see on the force and plotting 186 00:06:54,111 --> 00:06:56,333 the way ahead the OD has been very busy 187 00:06:56,460 --> 00:06:58,460 using all of our resource is and or 188 00:06:58,460 --> 00:07:00,071 researchers toe work hard on 189 00:07:00,071 --> 00:07:02,293 therapeutics and vaccines . We can talk 190 00:07:02,293 --> 00:07:04,516 more about that in our discussion . But 191 00:07:04,516 --> 00:07:06,682 we're also cognizant about the impacts 192 00:07:06,682 --> 00:07:08,738 that this cove in 19 may have on the 193 00:07:08,738 --> 00:07:11,200 force to date . I can say that we've 194 00:07:11,210 --> 00:07:12,932 we've had a very low impact on 195 00:07:12,932 --> 00:07:14,766 readiness . But over time we are 196 00:07:14,766 --> 00:07:16,730 anticipating what could be , ah , 197 00:07:16,740 --> 00:07:19,610 greater impact if we're not , if we 198 00:07:19,610 --> 00:07:21,443 don't see a change in true trick 199 00:07:21,443 --> 00:07:23,840 trajectory of the virus or how we adapt 200 00:07:23,840 --> 00:07:25,840 ourselves . So those are all things 201 00:07:25,840 --> 00:07:27,840 that were taking into consideration 202 00:07:27,840 --> 00:07:30,062 that we're actively planning on , and I 203 00:07:30,062 --> 00:07:32,396 look forward to discussing these things , 204 00:07:32,396 --> 00:07:34,451 Aziz , we discuss them in the coming 205 00:07:34,451 --> 00:07:36,396 hour here . Mike , let me just say 206 00:07:36,396 --> 00:07:38,451 again , I'm so very proud of our men 207 00:07:38,451 --> 00:07:40,507 and women uniform . Whether deployed 208 00:07:40,507 --> 00:07:42,507 here at home in the United States , 209 00:07:42,507 --> 00:07:44,618 where many of them are away from home 210 00:07:44,618 --> 00:07:46,784 and at the same time risking their own 211 00:07:46,784 --> 00:07:48,951 health or especially those of deployed 212 00:07:48,951 --> 00:07:50,951 abroad , I liked again thank all of 213 00:07:50,951 --> 00:07:53,007 them for what they're doing . And Mr 214 00:07:53,007 --> 00:07:55,118 Secretary , thank you and let me pick 215 00:07:55,118 --> 00:07:54,770 up by echoing that last comment in 216 00:07:54,770 --> 00:07:56,826 particular Justus John Allen . Thank 217 00:07:56,826 --> 00:07:59,159 you for joining us and for your service . 218 00:07:59,159 --> 00:08:00,992 I know we all owe a huge debt of 219 00:08:00,992 --> 00:08:03,103 gratitude to the men and women of the 220 00:08:03,103 --> 00:08:05,326 armed forces as well . As , of course , 221 00:08:05,326 --> 00:08:07,603 our police forces are first responders , 222 00:08:07,603 --> 00:08:09,659 all of you who are protecting us and 223 00:08:09,659 --> 00:08:11,881 keeping us safe . I wanted to pick up a 224 00:08:11,881 --> 00:08:10,990 fair amount on this question of 225 00:08:10,990 --> 00:08:13,380 readiness and how you're going to think 226 00:08:13,380 --> 00:08:15,830 about ensuring that in the period to 227 00:08:15,830 --> 00:08:18,130 come and maybe break it down into some 228 00:08:18,130 --> 00:08:21,730 specific categories . People training , 229 00:08:21,860 --> 00:08:24,370 maintenance and equipment slash 230 00:08:24,370 --> 00:08:26,481 procurement . I know all those things 231 00:08:26,481 --> 00:08:28,537 are very much on your mind . So if I 232 00:08:28,537 --> 00:08:30,370 could begin with people our most 233 00:08:30,370 --> 00:08:32,370 important asset of all , and you 234 00:08:32,370 --> 00:08:34,426 mentioned the force has not been hit 235 00:08:34,426 --> 00:08:36,592 that hard so far . I don't know if you 236 00:08:36,592 --> 00:08:39,130 want to share any statistics on the 237 00:08:39,130 --> 00:08:41,241 least in rough terms where we are . I 238 00:08:41,241 --> 00:08:43,074 think it's about 5 to 6000 total 239 00:08:43,074 --> 00:08:45,352 diagnosed cases in the entire military . 240 00:08:45,352 --> 00:08:47,519 But I'm sure you've got better numbers 241 00:08:47,519 --> 00:08:49,741 than I . And also where do you see that 242 00:08:49,741 --> 00:08:51,852 going in the weeks and months ahead ? 243 00:08:52,540 --> 00:08:54,651 Sure . Thank you . Now we can talk to 244 00:08:54,651 --> 00:08:56,818 each of those categories . So first on 245 00:08:56,818 --> 00:08:58,707 the people front , you know , one 246 00:08:58,707 --> 00:09:00,818 infection is too many . But I can say 247 00:09:00,818 --> 00:09:02,762 at this point in terms of ah , two 248 00:09:02,762 --> 00:09:04,762 million strong military , we've had 249 00:09:04,762 --> 00:09:06,818 fewer than 5000 persons infected and 250 00:09:06,818 --> 00:09:09,040 fewer than 100 have been hospitalized . 251 00:09:09,440 --> 00:09:12,000 So I think that that is a testament to 252 00:09:12,000 --> 00:09:14,230 a couple of things . One , we have a 253 00:09:14,230 --> 00:09:16,008 young fit , healthy force . But 254 00:09:16,008 --> 00:09:18,174 secondly , we've been issuing guidance 255 00:09:18,174 --> 00:09:20,341 to the force since late January . I've 256 00:09:20,341 --> 00:09:23,530 now issued nine or 10 updates to that 257 00:09:23,600 --> 00:09:26,430 instruction to our commanders , senior 258 00:09:26,430 --> 00:09:28,940 commanders to get out further winner in 259 00:09:28,940 --> 00:09:31,162 either their service or the respect the 260 00:09:31,162 --> 00:09:33,162 commands . And as you know , Mike , 261 00:09:33,162 --> 00:09:35,329 each of those commanders has extensive 262 00:09:35,329 --> 00:09:37,329 medical staffs , and resource is by 263 00:09:37,329 --> 00:09:39,329 which they can further amplify were 264 00:09:39,329 --> 00:09:41,440 refined that guide . And so , at this 265 00:09:41,440 --> 00:09:40,920 point time , we're in pretty good shape . 266 00:09:41,260 --> 00:09:44,700 It's tragic , but , uh uh , that we 267 00:09:44,700 --> 00:09:46,922 lost two service members , but only two 268 00:09:47,140 --> 00:09:49,260 is fairly good when you look at how 269 00:09:49,260 --> 00:09:51,427 Iraq and stack up against our civilian 270 00:09:51,427 --> 00:09:53,649 counterparts again , the forces holding 271 00:09:53,649 --> 00:09:55,593 pretty strong when it comes to the 272 00:09:55,593 --> 00:09:57,593 coronavirus . What concerns me more 273 00:09:57,593 --> 00:09:59,649 would be the long term impacts as we 274 00:09:59,649 --> 00:10:01,371 had to make adjustments to our 275 00:10:01,371 --> 00:10:03,649 recruiting and basic military training . 276 00:10:03,649 --> 00:10:05,593 Each of the services adapted their 277 00:10:05,593 --> 00:10:08,680 basic training on , given the respect 278 00:10:08,680 --> 00:10:11,020 of circumstances , how the new recruits 279 00:10:11,020 --> 00:10:13,242 flown to the training . In some cases , 280 00:10:13,242 --> 00:10:15,464 we did a one or two weeks suspension in 281 00:10:15,464 --> 00:10:17,576 order to build up additional capacity 282 00:10:17,576 --> 00:10:19,720 testing or whatnot . But for the most 283 00:10:19,720 --> 00:10:22,040 part , we've seen over the past 67 284 00:10:22,040 --> 00:10:24,890 weeks reduced throughput , and that 285 00:10:24,890 --> 00:10:26,834 will probably something that bears 286 00:10:26,834 --> 00:10:28,946 itself out in the long run . So we're 287 00:10:28,946 --> 00:10:31,168 paying very careful attention to that . 288 00:10:31,168 --> 00:10:33,334 I did not at any time want to shut off 289 00:10:33,334 --> 00:10:33,100 the pipeline because that has 290 00:10:33,100 --> 00:10:35,267 ramifications that could affect us for 291 00:10:35,267 --> 00:10:37,190 for months , if not years . So we 292 00:10:37,190 --> 00:10:39,357 continue to improve the pipeline . The 293 00:10:39,357 --> 00:10:41,579 services making have made a lot of good 294 00:10:41,579 --> 00:10:43,468 adjustments to that . With this . 295 00:10:43,468 --> 00:10:45,079 Multiple testing of recruits 296 00:10:45,079 --> 00:10:47,301 quarantining before they begin training 297 00:10:47,301 --> 00:10:49,190 and other mechanisms are taken to 298 00:10:49,190 --> 00:10:51,301 ensure that we can maintain that flow 299 00:10:51,301 --> 00:10:53,357 of people through the system and all 300 00:10:53,357 --> 00:10:55,246 the services air now continuing , 301 00:10:55,246 --> 00:10:57,246 recruiting and bringing people into 302 00:10:57,246 --> 00:10:59,301 quote unquote boot camp . Continuing 303 00:10:59,301 --> 00:10:58,550 that process , even though you 304 00:10:58,550 --> 00:11:00,550 suspended it for a short time a few 305 00:11:00,550 --> 00:11:02,606 weeks ago , is that correct ? Well , 306 00:11:02,606 --> 00:11:04,828 they continue on recruiting front to do 307 00:11:04,828 --> 00:11:06,661 it . Virtually . In some cases , 308 00:11:06,661 --> 00:11:08,828 they're picking it back up in person , 309 00:11:08,828 --> 00:11:10,883 but that no time to d o D do ah do a 310 00:11:10,883 --> 00:11:13,090 department wide stand down on basic 311 00:11:13,090 --> 00:11:14,868 training ? Each of the services 312 00:11:14,868 --> 00:11:17,160 Actually , the Army and I believe the 313 00:11:17,160 --> 00:11:20,360 Navy took a one or two week pause at 314 00:11:20,360 --> 00:11:22,582 different points to again improve their 315 00:11:22,582 --> 00:11:24,249 capacity . Make sure they had 316 00:11:24,249 --> 00:11:26,471 sufficient testing kids , etcetera . We 317 00:11:26,471 --> 00:11:28,749 never did a department wide stand down . 318 00:11:28,749 --> 00:11:30,971 The each of the services knew what they 319 00:11:30,971 --> 00:11:30,910 need to do . They had the guidance from 320 00:11:30,910 --> 00:11:32,854 us . They have medical resource is 321 00:11:32,854 --> 00:11:35,077 professionals . And so they adapted . A 322 00:11:35,077 --> 00:11:37,132 based on her situation is , you know 323 00:11:37,132 --> 00:11:36,840 they have , You know , they trained in 324 00:11:36,840 --> 00:11:38,951 different parts of the country . They 325 00:11:38,951 --> 00:11:41,118 have a different force flow input into 326 00:11:41,118 --> 00:11:43,118 their system , so they were able to 327 00:11:43,118 --> 00:11:45,173 adapt it to their unique situation . 328 00:11:45,250 --> 00:11:47,194 And while we're thinking about the 329 00:11:47,194 --> 00:11:49,250 places where people are concentrated 330 00:11:49,250 --> 00:11:51,361 the most , such as boot camp , let me 331 00:11:51,361 --> 00:11:53,417 ask about Navy ships because we know 332 00:11:53,417 --> 00:11:55,472 that obviously , the Teddy Roosevelt 333 00:11:55,472 --> 00:11:55,030 aircraft carriers been in the news . 334 00:11:55,040 --> 00:11:57,490 Also , I believe the U . S s Kidd at a 335 00:11:57,490 --> 00:11:59,712 number of cases . Are there other ships 336 00:11:59,712 --> 00:12:01,601 that are being affected ? And you 337 00:12:01,601 --> 00:12:03,768 anticipate being able to stay ahead of 338 00:12:03,768 --> 00:12:05,990 that problem or two shifts sort of hold 339 00:12:05,990 --> 00:12:08,212 a special place in your concern , given 340 00:12:08,212 --> 00:12:10,490 the proximity of sailors aboard . Well , 341 00:12:10,490 --> 00:12:12,490 the statistics show that the safest 342 00:12:12,490 --> 00:12:14,768 place to be is on a deployed Navy ship , 343 00:12:14,768 --> 00:12:16,879 as compared to one that's import . So 344 00:12:16,879 --> 00:12:18,990 of the 90 plus ships we haven't see , 345 00:12:18,990 --> 00:12:21,046 um , we only have two that have been 346 00:12:21,046 --> 00:12:23,212 affected . That Teddy Roosevelt is the 347 00:12:23,212 --> 00:12:25,323 is the most prominent , and the 2nd 1 348 00:12:25,323 --> 00:12:27,434 was U . S S Kidd , and we're not sure 349 00:12:27,434 --> 00:12:29,490 where she picked it up . It may have 350 00:12:29,490 --> 00:12:31,712 been through a counter drug operation , 351 00:12:31,712 --> 00:12:33,712 but two ships out of , I think 94 . 352 00:12:33,712 --> 00:12:35,934 It's a pretty good record . The Navy is 353 00:12:35,934 --> 00:12:38,101 it taking a lot of good practices they 354 00:12:38,101 --> 00:12:40,212 have learned from the Teddy Roosevelt 355 00:12:40,212 --> 00:12:42,268 and again , before ship deploys , it 356 00:12:42,268 --> 00:12:44,212 goes through multiple tests of its 357 00:12:44,212 --> 00:12:46,268 sailors . They are quarantined for a 358 00:12:46,268 --> 00:12:48,379 couple weeks , and of course we don't 359 00:12:48,379 --> 00:12:50,323 bring a ship back in if it's being 360 00:12:50,323 --> 00:12:50,040 replaced by one going out . So we've 361 00:12:50,040 --> 00:12:52,040 been very careful that we've had we 362 00:12:52,040 --> 00:12:54,750 have had ships that airport side that 363 00:12:54,760 --> 00:12:56,927 have had sailors infected , but that's 364 00:12:56,927 --> 00:12:58,927 not unlike what you might see at an 365 00:12:58,927 --> 00:13:00,982 Army base or an Air Force base where 366 00:13:00,982 --> 00:13:02,760 you have the sailors out in the 367 00:13:02,760 --> 00:13:05,790 community who may , uh , get infected 368 00:13:05,790 --> 00:13:07,957 by the virus . But again , before they 369 00:13:07,957 --> 00:13:10,123 go to see we bring them in , we test , 370 00:13:10,123 --> 00:13:12,346 we quarantine , and we make adjustments 371 00:13:12,346 --> 00:13:14,512 to make sure our ships get out on time 372 00:13:14,512 --> 00:13:16,734 before I get to training , which I know 373 00:13:16,734 --> 00:13:18,790 is a little more complicated topic . 374 00:13:18,790 --> 00:13:18,140 And as you alluded to in your opening 375 00:13:18,140 --> 00:13:20,307 remarks , just one word question about 376 00:13:20,307 --> 00:13:22,490 people . Have you seen any trends yet 377 00:13:22,500 --> 00:13:24,611 in the proclivity of people to either 378 00:13:24,611 --> 00:13:26,667 join ah through , you know , through 379 00:13:26,667 --> 00:13:28,944 recruiting or to stay in for retention ? 380 00:13:28,944 --> 00:13:31,400 We know that there probably competing 381 00:13:31,400 --> 00:13:33,344 pressures here . On the one hand , 382 00:13:33,344 --> 00:13:35,511 people are sort of locked down and not 383 00:13:35,511 --> 00:13:37,567 really sure about their futures . On 384 00:13:37,567 --> 00:13:39,844 the other hand , we know that you know , 385 00:13:39,844 --> 00:13:42,011 silver lining of economic downturns is 386 00:13:42,011 --> 00:13:41,410 that the Department of Defense 387 00:13:41,410 --> 00:13:43,632 sometimes has an easier time recruiting 388 00:13:43,632 --> 00:13:45,854 and retaining people , and you need out 389 00:13:45,854 --> 00:13:47,966 of that two million person force what 390 00:13:47,966 --> 00:13:50,550 1.3 million active , 800,000 or so 391 00:13:50,960 --> 00:13:53,620 Reservist , you need several 100,000 392 00:13:53,620 --> 00:13:56,250 people a year to bring in , depending 393 00:13:56,250 --> 00:13:58,306 on what the retention rates are . So 394 00:13:58,306 --> 00:14:00,306 how did those numbers look so far ? 395 00:14:00,306 --> 00:14:02,417 What we don't have hard data yet with 396 00:14:02,417 --> 00:14:04,583 regard to recruiting , As I said for a 397 00:14:04,583 --> 00:14:06,583 period of weeks there , each of the 398 00:14:06,583 --> 00:14:08,806 services went to virtual recruiting and 399 00:14:08,806 --> 00:14:10,806 anecdotally , they told me that the 400 00:14:10,806 --> 00:14:10,500 pace was maintained . But we'll see . 401 00:14:10,500 --> 00:14:12,667 It's only it's only been several weeks 402 00:14:12,667 --> 00:14:14,556 on the backside . We equally have 403 00:14:14,556 --> 00:14:16,580 anecdotal information that service 404 00:14:16,580 --> 00:14:18,636 members who were scheduled to what's 405 00:14:18,636 --> 00:14:20,747 called E . T s leave the service have 406 00:14:20,747 --> 00:14:22,636 asked to stay aboard because they 407 00:14:22,636 --> 00:14:24,960 either like what they're doing or a Z 408 00:14:24,960 --> 00:14:27,071 you mentioned . The economic downturn 409 00:14:27,071 --> 00:14:28,960 has has shown folks that there is 410 00:14:28,960 --> 00:14:30,738 greater job opportunities , job 411 00:14:30,738 --> 00:14:32,738 security in the military . So we're 412 00:14:32,738 --> 00:14:34,849 gonna wait and see how that plays out 413 00:14:34,849 --> 00:14:37,182 the statistics , you know , move around , 414 00:14:37,182 --> 00:14:36,940 month , month , day by day . One thing 415 00:14:36,940 --> 00:14:39,107 we've been conscious of , which is why 416 00:14:39,107 --> 00:14:41,218 we step back a few weeks ago to reset 417 00:14:41,218 --> 00:14:43,450 basic training . As we know that May 418 00:14:43,450 --> 00:14:45,561 and June and July are big high school 419 00:14:45,561 --> 00:14:47,783 graduation months . So we don't We want 420 00:14:47,783 --> 00:14:49,728 to make sure the force is ready to 421 00:14:49,728 --> 00:14:51,617 absorb those Ah , young Americans 422 00:14:51,617 --> 00:14:53,617 coming in , men and women coming in 423 00:14:53,617 --> 00:14:55,672 after they graduate high school that 424 00:14:55,672 --> 00:14:57,672 we're prepared to absorb as many of 425 00:14:57,672 --> 00:14:56,880 them as we can and put him through the 426 00:14:56,880 --> 00:14:59,970 system . Thank you . On the issue of 427 00:14:59,970 --> 00:15:02,090 training , I know that this is very 428 00:15:02,090 --> 00:15:05,590 complicated because my sense and please 429 00:15:05,600 --> 00:15:07,767 correct me if I'm wrong and also maybe 430 00:15:07,767 --> 00:15:09,933 an anecdote or two about an example of 431 00:15:09,933 --> 00:15:12,100 how trade has been affected . My sense 432 00:15:12,100 --> 00:15:13,989 is , a lot of small unit training 433 00:15:13,989 --> 00:15:16,211 continues because you can sort of treat 434 00:15:16,211 --> 00:15:18,378 an Army squad with a dozen people or , 435 00:15:18,378 --> 00:15:20,489 you know , maybe even an Air Force on 436 00:15:20,489 --> 00:15:23,110 that unit of a pilot and a back seater 437 00:15:23,110 --> 00:15:25,520 and associated mechanics and control 438 00:15:25,520 --> 00:15:27,631 officers . You can treat those groups 439 00:15:27,631 --> 00:15:29,687 almost like small families , and you 440 00:15:29,687 --> 00:15:32,170 contest you can quarantine , and my 441 00:15:32,170 --> 00:15:33,948 sense is a lot of that training 442 00:15:33,948 --> 00:15:36,114 continues , although I have a specific 443 00:15:36,114 --> 00:15:37,892 interest whether blank training 444 00:15:37,892 --> 00:15:40,003 continues as before . But I know that 445 00:15:40,003 --> 00:15:41,781 as you get to larger and larger 446 00:15:41,781 --> 00:15:43,837 echelons , of course , you have much 447 00:15:43,837 --> 00:15:45,892 more concerned about your ability to 448 00:15:45,892 --> 00:15:48,059 reliably prevent a few individuals who 449 00:15:48,059 --> 00:15:50,281 may be a contagious and unaware of it . 450 00:15:50,281 --> 00:15:52,503 Maybe , uh , from affecting the broader 451 00:15:52,503 --> 00:15:54,003 force , and therefore , my 452 00:15:54,003 --> 00:15:56,059 understanding is that on some of the 453 00:15:56,059 --> 00:15:58,570 Big Unit maneuvers , exercises like , 454 00:15:58,570 --> 00:16:01,470 for example , in your own armies Army 455 00:16:01,590 --> 00:16:03,312 National Training Center Joint 456 00:16:03,312 --> 00:16:05,646 Readiness Training Center in California , 457 00:16:05,646 --> 00:16:07,534 Louisiana . Up until now , you've 458 00:16:07,534 --> 00:16:09,646 suspended the brigade scale exercises 459 00:16:09,646 --> 00:16:11,812 that involve several 1000 soldiers but 460 00:16:11,812 --> 00:16:13,812 time . But you're looking to resume 461 00:16:13,812 --> 00:16:15,534 that . I believe you're on the 462 00:16:15,534 --> 00:16:17,312 Congolese side last week with a 463 00:16:17,312 --> 00:16:19,201 Security Force Assistance Brigade 464 00:16:19,540 --> 00:16:22,780 rotation to the JR TC in Louisiana , 465 00:16:22,780 --> 00:16:24,780 which would be a little smaller but 466 00:16:24,780 --> 00:16:27,002 still more than 1000 soldiers . Is that 467 00:16:27,002 --> 00:16:29,280 basically how you're thinking about it , 468 00:16:29,280 --> 00:16:29,050 that you're going to try to take step 469 00:16:29,050 --> 00:16:30,939 by , step back towards the bigger 470 00:16:30,939 --> 00:16:33,460 exercises ? Or was it is too soon to be 471 00:16:33,460 --> 00:16:35,660 sure on confident , But what's your 472 00:16:35,660 --> 00:16:37,660 basic way of thinking about getting 473 00:16:37,660 --> 00:16:39,938 training back where you think it needs ? 474 00:16:40,340 --> 00:16:42,340 You're basically right , Mike , you 475 00:16:42,340 --> 00:16:44,562 summed it up . I mean , the smaller the 476 00:16:44,562 --> 00:16:44,440 unit , the more capable you are , 477 00:16:44,940 --> 00:16:47,051 preserving the integrity of that unit 478 00:16:47,051 --> 00:16:49,273 and training as you get higher in terms 479 00:16:49,273 --> 00:16:51,440 of the size and scale , a scope of the 480 00:16:51,440 --> 00:16:53,551 exercise more challenging becomes and 481 00:16:53,551 --> 00:16:55,773 the more risk cubes or that you may get 482 00:16:55,773 --> 00:16:55,480 soldiers , sailors , airmen and Marines 483 00:16:55,480 --> 00:16:58,110 infected . So the army's working Ah , 484 00:16:58,120 --> 00:17:00,120 new constant by which they would do 485 00:17:00,120 --> 00:17:02,120 multi echelon training . But in the 486 00:17:02,120 --> 00:17:03,953 disaggregated wayto ensure force 487 00:17:03,953 --> 00:17:06,176 protection , Your are right . We had to 488 00:17:06,176 --> 00:17:08,453 suspend or cancel some combat training , 489 00:17:08,453 --> 00:17:10,564 second center exercises , red flags , 490 00:17:10,720 --> 00:17:12,942 etcetera . And that's the one area when 491 00:17:12,942 --> 00:17:14,720 it comes to training that we're 492 00:17:14,720 --> 00:17:16,831 concerned about that over time it may 493 00:17:16,831 --> 00:17:18,831 have an accumulative impact at this 494 00:17:18,831 --> 00:17:21,053 point time we're not . We're seeing low 495 00:17:21,053 --> 00:17:20,660 impact , but over time it could 496 00:17:20,660 --> 00:17:22,882 accumulate , particularly as we look at 497 00:17:22,882 --> 00:17:24,771 how we train with our friends and 498 00:17:24,771 --> 00:17:26,660 allies . And so that's one of the 499 00:17:26,660 --> 00:17:29,300 concerns that we that we look at . One 500 00:17:29,300 --> 00:17:31,522 of things we have done , though , is we 501 00:17:31,522 --> 00:17:33,810 looked at tearing how we address our 502 00:17:33,810 --> 00:17:35,754 forces , how we test them , how we 503 00:17:35,754 --> 00:17:37,810 preserve their readiness . So at the 504 00:17:37,810 --> 00:17:39,977 top of that , here are what we call of 505 00:17:39,977 --> 00:17:42,143 course , are Tier one forces . Whether 506 00:17:42,143 --> 00:17:44,366 it's our strategic forces are premier . 507 00:17:44,366 --> 00:17:46,366 Counterterrorism forces are premier 508 00:17:46,366 --> 00:17:48,532 cyber command forces , all those types 509 00:17:48,532 --> 00:17:50,699 of soldiers , sailors and marines . We 510 00:17:50,699 --> 00:17:52,810 want to make sure that can continue . 511 00:17:52,810 --> 00:17:55,032 The mission could continue to train and 512 00:17:55,032 --> 00:17:56,977 protect the country . We're taking 513 00:17:56,977 --> 00:17:59,199 extra care with regard to their testing 514 00:17:59,199 --> 00:17:58,470 they're quarantining . They're 515 00:17:58,470 --> 00:18:00,690 safeguarding . So we preserved . We 516 00:18:00,690 --> 00:18:03,330 preserve that capability that we we 517 00:18:03,330 --> 00:18:05,930 know we absolutely must have . So if I 518 00:18:05,930 --> 00:18:08,152 can follow up with a couple of specific 519 00:18:08,152 --> 00:18:10,263 examples and with apologies , if some 520 00:18:10,263 --> 00:18:12,430 of these , you know , get sensitive or 521 00:18:12,430 --> 00:18:14,541 classified and you may not be able to 522 00:18:14,541 --> 00:18:16,374 respond , let's take Korea , for 523 00:18:16,374 --> 00:18:18,597 example , where we have an Army brigade 524 00:18:18,597 --> 00:18:20,208 all the time , as well as to 525 00:18:20,208 --> 00:18:22,263 substantial Air Force wings . And of 526 00:18:22,263 --> 00:18:24,263 course , we've also had the broader 527 00:18:24,263 --> 00:18:24,200 question . As President , Trump has 528 00:18:24,200 --> 00:18:26,033 tried to engage Kim Jeong Eun on 529 00:18:26,033 --> 00:18:27,644 nuclear negotiations , we've 530 00:18:27,644 --> 00:18:29,589 essentially seen the two countries 531 00:18:29,589 --> 00:18:31,533 moved towards a little bit of a de 532 00:18:31,533 --> 00:18:33,644 facto mutual moratorium . We don't do 533 00:18:33,644 --> 00:18:35,700 the bigger exercises . They don't do 534 00:18:35,700 --> 00:18:37,811 the nuclear and I C B M tests . In my 535 00:18:37,811 --> 00:18:40,033 opinion , that's an extremely good deal 536 00:18:40,033 --> 00:18:42,200 for the United States . But leave that 537 00:18:42,200 --> 00:18:44,311 aside , I know that you secretary has 538 00:18:44,311 --> 00:18:46,478 have to be concerned about anything of 539 00:18:46,478 --> 00:18:48,644 a four of unit . In a place like Korea 540 00:18:48,644 --> 00:18:50,811 they detail you can offer about that . 541 00:18:50,811 --> 00:18:52,922 Well , I'd say First of all , General 542 00:18:52,922 --> 00:18:54,756 Abrams has done a great job on a 543 00:18:54,756 --> 00:18:56,922 peninsula . You know , He he was there 544 00:18:56,922 --> 00:18:59,089 when the Corona virus first took off . 545 00:18:59,089 --> 00:19:01,630 I think in in January and , uh , 546 00:19:01,640 --> 00:19:03,690 certainly into February , he 547 00:19:03,700 --> 00:19:05,700 implemented with the guy that bride 548 00:19:05,700 --> 00:19:07,811 guidance we gave him . He took really 549 00:19:07,811 --> 00:19:09,867 some bold actions to control it . He 550 00:19:09,867 --> 00:19:11,922 raised his health protection control 551 00:19:11,922 --> 00:19:13,867 level . He made restrictions , put 552 00:19:13,867 --> 00:19:15,978 other things in place , and he's been 553 00:19:15,978 --> 00:19:15,620 able to really preserve the readiness 554 00:19:15,620 --> 00:19:17,509 of the forced on there . So I can 555 00:19:17,509 --> 00:19:19,620 confidently say that we're preserving 556 00:19:19,620 --> 00:19:21,842 the fight tonight Status readiness that 557 00:19:21,842 --> 00:19:24,009 we need on the peninsula with our with 558 00:19:24,009 --> 00:19:26,064 our rock allies . And General Abrams 559 00:19:26,064 --> 00:19:28,342 has been able to sustain that . I mean , 560 00:19:28,342 --> 00:19:28,210 I hear from him or speak with him 561 00:19:28,210 --> 00:19:30,670 weekly , the forces in very good shape , 562 00:19:30,990 --> 00:19:32,879 and you're right . It's all about 563 00:19:32,879 --> 00:19:34,934 deterring bad behavior , and they've 564 00:19:34,934 --> 00:19:36,934 been able to do it and preserve the 565 00:19:36,934 --> 00:19:39,046 readiness as a result , for example , 566 00:19:39,046 --> 00:19:41,268 and again with apologies of I'm pushing 567 00:19:41,268 --> 00:19:43,268 too far . But they might be able to 568 00:19:43,268 --> 00:19:45,323 still do , let's say , company level 569 00:19:45,323 --> 00:19:47,490 training with a couple of 100 soldiers 570 00:19:47,490 --> 00:19:47,480 at a time . And with some air 571 00:19:47,690 --> 00:19:49,770 coordination with Air Force units as 572 00:19:49,770 --> 00:19:51,937 well as Republic of Korea units , they 573 00:19:51,937 --> 00:19:54,690 can still do enough to mimic what an 574 00:19:54,690 --> 00:19:56,912 actual fight would be like that they're 575 00:19:56,912 --> 00:19:58,857 not losing those kinds of skills . 576 00:19:58,857 --> 00:20:01,079 That's right , we can . We can preserve 577 00:20:01,079 --> 00:20:03,134 readiness , our capability . We also 578 00:20:03,134 --> 00:20:05,246 augment that capability that training 579 00:20:05,246 --> 00:20:07,468 with off peninsula forces . Resource is 580 00:20:07,468 --> 00:20:09,690 so whether it's ah ah bomber presence . 581 00:20:09,690 --> 00:20:11,801 Fighter aircraft , of course , enable 582 00:20:11,801 --> 00:20:14,023 presence . We bring that as well . That 583 00:20:14,023 --> 00:20:16,023 doesn't have to be stationed on the 584 00:20:16,023 --> 00:20:18,134 peninsula to do that while I'm on the 585 00:20:18,134 --> 00:20:19,968 subject of Asian to come back to 586 00:20:19,968 --> 00:20:22,134 readiness and covert , of course . But 587 00:20:22,134 --> 00:20:24,301 some people have taken note of farmers 588 00:20:24,301 --> 00:20:26,412 no longer being permanently stationed 589 00:20:26,412 --> 00:20:28,412 on Guam but rotating through others 590 00:20:28,412 --> 00:20:30,690 have wondered What's the pace of U . S . 591 00:20:30,690 --> 00:20:32,857 Navy deployment in the South China Sea 592 00:20:32,857 --> 00:20:32,250 and Response toe ? What you said 593 00:20:32,250 --> 00:20:34,770 earlier , the increased tempo of some 594 00:20:34,770 --> 00:20:37,850 of China's efforts to intimidate oh or 595 00:20:37,850 --> 00:20:39,961 exercise its own claimed authority in 596 00:20:39,961 --> 00:20:42,072 the South China Sea . Any details you 597 00:20:42,072 --> 00:20:44,294 could provide about how you're thinking 598 00:20:44,294 --> 00:20:46,406 about the B 50 twos and other bombers 599 00:20:46,406 --> 00:20:48,517 on Guam , as well as Navy deployments 600 00:20:48,517 --> 00:20:50,683 to the South China city . Well , since 601 00:20:50,683 --> 00:20:52,906 I came into office , I said I was going 602 00:20:52,906 --> 00:20:51,980 to implement the national defense 603 00:20:51,980 --> 00:20:54,300 strategy . It was a strategy that I 604 00:20:54,300 --> 00:20:56,780 fully supported as Army secretary , a 605 00:20:56,780 --> 00:20:59,230 key tenet of ah of that strategy is 606 00:20:59,230 --> 00:21:01,397 called dynamic force employment . It's 607 00:21:01,397 --> 00:21:03,563 the way by which you maintain a degree 608 00:21:03,563 --> 00:21:05,720 of strategic predictability to ensure 609 00:21:05,720 --> 00:21:08,420 the rightness of your force . But but 610 00:21:08,430 --> 00:21:10,580 garner a higher degree of operational 611 00:21:10,590 --> 00:21:12,970 unpredictability . So we've been taking 612 00:21:12,970 --> 00:21:15,081 several steps . Some are known . Some 613 00:21:15,081 --> 00:21:17,192 are unknown , many more unknown . But 614 00:21:17,192 --> 00:21:19,414 one of the known things that's come out 615 00:21:19,414 --> 00:21:21,414 in recent weeks is is moving from a 616 00:21:21,414 --> 00:21:23,970 continual bomber presence on Guam back 617 00:21:23,970 --> 00:21:25,914 to our deployed forces from United 618 00:21:25,914 --> 00:21:28,137 States . So what we can do in that case 619 00:21:28,137 --> 00:21:29,748 now , as we have far greater 620 00:21:29,748 --> 00:21:31,748 flexibility , were able to maintain 621 00:21:31,748 --> 00:21:33,970 higher levels of greatness and not just 622 00:21:33,970 --> 00:21:35,859 rightness in a single ah function 623 00:21:35,859 --> 00:21:37,859 remission but across a multitude of 624 00:21:37,859 --> 00:21:39,970 missions that the bombers perform and 625 00:21:39,970 --> 00:21:41,692 we can provide , Ah , as great 626 00:21:41,692 --> 00:21:43,748 assurance to our allies and partners 627 00:21:43,748 --> 00:21:45,914 than we did in the past . So this is a 628 00:21:45,914 --> 00:21:47,748 win win for us in terms of again 629 00:21:47,748 --> 00:21:49,748 operational unpredictability to our 630 00:21:49,748 --> 00:21:49,720 adversaries , but at the same time 631 00:21:49,880 --> 00:21:51,936 increasing readiness and maintaining 632 00:21:51,936 --> 00:21:53,713 our assurance to our allies and 633 00:21:53,713 --> 00:21:55,936 partners with regard to the Navy in the 634 00:21:55,936 --> 00:21:57,880 in the Pacific and Indo pay calm . 635 00:21:58,120 --> 00:22:00,342 Admiral Davidson has done a great job . 636 00:22:00,342 --> 00:22:02,509 He's actually picked up his tempo when 637 00:22:02,509 --> 00:22:04,620 it comes to operations in places like 638 00:22:04,620 --> 00:22:07,170 the South China Sea with regard , our 639 00:22:07,170 --> 00:22:09,770 presence , whether it's ah surface sub 640 00:22:09,770 --> 00:22:11,826 service or an aerial presence , were 641 00:22:11,826 --> 00:22:13,659 conducting a lot of surveillance 642 00:22:13,659 --> 00:22:15,881 flights . We have conducted a number of 643 00:22:15,881 --> 00:22:18,560 ah Taiwan Strait transits . We are 644 00:22:18,560 --> 00:22:20,504 continue to watch closely what the 645 00:22:20,504 --> 00:22:22,838 Chinese are doing and and , as you know , 646 00:22:22,838 --> 00:22:24,949 it's been reported . The Chinese have 647 00:22:24,949 --> 00:22:26,616 been , ah , a little bit more 648 00:22:26,616 --> 00:22:28,727 provocative in that part of the world 649 00:22:28,727 --> 00:22:30,560 we we saw with a sunk I think of 650 00:22:30,560 --> 00:22:32,727 Vietnamese vessel . They're performing 651 00:22:32,727 --> 00:22:34,893 other things that are just , ah , very 652 00:22:34,893 --> 00:22:34,600 aggressive and not consistent with the 653 00:22:34,600 --> 00:22:36,767 international rules that we should all 654 00:22:36,767 --> 00:22:38,989 be following . So Advil Davidson's done 655 00:22:38,989 --> 00:22:41,211 a good job in terms of maintaining that 656 00:22:41,211 --> 00:22:43,378 show of force , that deterrence , that 657 00:22:43,378 --> 00:22:45,489 capability and readiness that we need 658 00:22:45,489 --> 00:22:47,600 in the Indo Pacific region . One last 659 00:22:47,600 --> 00:22:49,767 point on that that I will come back to 660 00:22:49,767 --> 00:22:49,660 training and then maintenance an 661 00:22:49,670 --> 00:22:51,620 acquisition if I could . But some 662 00:22:51,620 --> 00:22:53,731 people have noted over the years that 663 00:22:53,731 --> 00:22:55,787 even as the Chinese have gotten push 664 00:22:55,787 --> 00:22:57,898 here , if you will in the South China 665 00:22:57,898 --> 00:22:59,676 Sea , they usually handled most 666 00:22:59,676 --> 00:23:01,840 encounters with a degree of military 667 00:23:01,840 --> 00:23:04,030 professionalism . Not all encounters , 668 00:23:04,030 --> 00:23:06,141 as we know tragically even going back 669 00:23:06,141 --> 00:23:08,252 to 2001 with the E P . Three incident 670 00:23:08,252 --> 00:23:10,670 and some other recent attempts maybe 34 671 00:23:10,670 --> 00:23:13,890 years ago to have their shifts sale 672 00:23:13,900 --> 00:23:16,011 right in front of ours on a couple of 673 00:23:16,011 --> 00:23:18,178 occasions that were dangerous . But on 674 00:23:18,178 --> 00:23:20,470 the whole , my understanding is that 675 00:23:20,470 --> 00:23:23,020 most U . S military officers and others 676 00:23:23,020 --> 00:23:25,187 watching the situation have considered 677 00:23:25,187 --> 00:23:27,242 the Chinese to be pushy , but within 678 00:23:27,242 --> 00:23:29,242 certain , more or less professional 679 00:23:29,242 --> 00:23:31,464 bounds . Is that accurate ? And you see 680 00:23:31,464 --> 00:23:33,576 any change in recent weeks and months 681 00:23:33,576 --> 00:23:35,687 about whether the Chinese show proper 682 00:23:35,687 --> 00:23:37,464 professionalism and these close 683 00:23:37,464 --> 00:23:39,409 encounters ? It depends . I mean , 684 00:23:39,409 --> 00:23:41,353 generally , we would classified as 685 00:23:41,353 --> 00:23:43,409 professional . When they don't we do 686 00:23:43,409 --> 00:23:45,464 marsh them were able to call them up 687 00:23:45,464 --> 00:23:47,353 and speak to him and cite the bad 688 00:23:47,353 --> 00:23:49,520 behavior . In some cases , it's , ah , 689 00:23:49,520 --> 00:23:51,631 we would consider it unprofessional . 690 00:23:51,631 --> 00:23:53,742 But maybe not intentional may just be 691 00:23:53,742 --> 00:23:55,909 bad seamanship or bad politics . We do 692 00:23:55,909 --> 00:23:57,798 see cases of that as well , where 693 00:23:57,798 --> 00:23:59,742 they're trying to perform maneuver 694 00:23:59,742 --> 00:24:01,964 that's outside the skill of the pilot , 695 00:24:01,964 --> 00:24:04,187 if you will . So it's a mix of things , 696 00:24:04,187 --> 00:24:06,409 but we stay in close contact with him . 697 00:24:06,409 --> 00:24:08,576 I of course , talk to my counterpart , 698 00:24:08,576 --> 00:24:08,270 the defense minister . It's important 699 00:24:08,270 --> 00:24:10,381 we maintain lines communication , and 700 00:24:10,381 --> 00:24:12,492 we cite their bad behavior and , uh , 701 00:24:12,492 --> 00:24:14,920 their bad behavior not just being , you 702 00:24:14,920 --> 00:24:16,976 know , how they again maneuver their 703 00:24:16,976 --> 00:24:18,920 ship with airplane , but also when 704 00:24:18,920 --> 00:24:21,087 they're taking aggressive actions that 705 00:24:21,087 --> 00:24:20,700 are outside the norms of the 706 00:24:20,700 --> 00:24:23,330 international rules , whether , uh , 707 00:24:23,340 --> 00:24:25,340 they're claiming territory or space 708 00:24:25,340 --> 00:24:27,570 that simply is not theirs . And we want 709 00:24:27,570 --> 00:24:30,530 to make sure we maintain , ah , again 710 00:24:30,530 --> 00:24:32,310 the laws of the sea and the 711 00:24:32,310 --> 00:24:34,532 international rules that have sustained 712 00:24:34,532 --> 00:24:36,699 us all very well for decades now . And 713 00:24:36,699 --> 00:24:38,866 we see the Chinese continue to try and 714 00:24:38,866 --> 00:24:41,210 bend those to change those and to shape 715 00:24:41,210 --> 00:24:43,980 them in their own favour . So why not 716 00:24:43,980 --> 00:24:46,130 returning back to training and ask ? 717 00:24:46,480 --> 00:24:48,313 You do also explain maybe from a 718 00:24:48,313 --> 00:24:50,424 different angle how you were thinking 719 00:24:50,424 --> 00:24:52,202 about the path towards resuming 720 00:24:52,202 --> 00:24:54,313 training . You've already spelled out 721 00:24:54,313 --> 00:24:56,536 some of the things you intend to do and 722 00:24:56,536 --> 00:24:58,647 how you're perhaps going Teoh . Start 723 00:24:58,647 --> 00:25:00,647 with units that are in parts of the 724 00:25:00,647 --> 00:25:02,813 country that are less affected or that 725 00:25:02,813 --> 00:25:04,980 had nothing hospital capacity , and if 726 00:25:04,980 --> 00:25:04,840 there's a problem , they can respond . 727 00:25:04,840 --> 00:25:07,540 As Secretary McCarthy explained last 728 00:25:07,540 --> 00:25:09,890 week , You know that we did with him . 729 00:25:10,190 --> 00:25:12,357 But I wondered , are you going to sort 730 00:25:12,357 --> 00:25:14,468 of also rely on more testing becoming 731 00:25:14,468 --> 00:25:16,634 available ? And therefore , as you get 732 00:25:16,634 --> 00:25:18,690 into the summer when you're going to 733 00:25:18,690 --> 00:25:20,912 resume a red flag or a brigade rotation 734 00:25:20,912 --> 00:25:22,746 in California at the ends at the 735 00:25:22,746 --> 00:25:24,746 National Training Center , that you 736 00:25:24,746 --> 00:25:26,746 have even more ability to virtually 737 00:25:26,746 --> 00:25:28,857 test almost everyone going in ? Where 738 00:25:28,857 --> 00:25:30,690 you gonna rely on the quarantine 739 00:25:30,690 --> 00:25:32,523 concept where you make sure that 740 00:25:32,523 --> 00:25:34,412 anybody going to a big you know , 741 00:25:34,412 --> 00:25:36,680 maneuver is tested and sequestered away 742 00:25:36,680 --> 00:25:38,902 for a couple weeks and therefore you're 743 00:25:38,902 --> 00:25:41,124 pretty confident that you don't need to 744 00:25:41,124 --> 00:25:43,291 worry too much about the potential for 745 00:25:43,291 --> 00:25:45,347 an outbreak ? What are the different 746 00:25:45,347 --> 00:25:47,458 pieces of the puzzle is you look at , 747 00:25:47,458 --> 00:25:49,513 we're going . For the most part , we 748 00:25:49,513 --> 00:25:49,080 haven't stopped training . We training 749 00:25:49,080 --> 00:25:51,290 is critical . Teoh Readiness as his 750 00:25:51,290 --> 00:25:53,234 maintenance , as are the personnel 751 00:25:53,234 --> 00:25:55,580 fills , as is our supply system . So 752 00:25:55,830 --> 00:25:57,441 we've had to make some smart 753 00:25:57,441 --> 00:25:59,441 adjustments to get their , uh , two 754 00:25:59,441 --> 00:26:01,608 degree weaken train and do some degree 755 00:26:01,608 --> 00:26:03,830 of social distancing . We're doing that 756 00:26:03,830 --> 00:26:05,970 depending on the situation that the 757 00:26:05,970 --> 00:26:08,430 challenger and I think you've spoke , 758 00:26:08,430 --> 00:26:10,319 putting some of the things you've 759 00:26:10,319 --> 00:26:12,263 written and said . Each service is 760 00:26:12,263 --> 00:26:15,390 different each each , each each 761 00:26:15,390 --> 00:26:17,168 training areas different , each 762 00:26:17,168 --> 00:26:19,279 training scenarios different . So you 763 00:26:19,279 --> 00:26:21,168 gotta be able to adapt those core 764 00:26:21,168 --> 00:26:23,279 principles , those core guidelines to 765 00:26:23,279 --> 00:26:25,446 the situation in hand . We've spoken , 766 00:26:25,446 --> 00:26:27,668 for example , folks like Dr Fauci , and 767 00:26:27,668 --> 00:26:29,668 are adapting his principles and his 768 00:26:29,668 --> 00:26:31,834 guidelines to the force and giving the 769 00:26:31,834 --> 00:26:34,057 commanders the freedom to to do that so 770 00:26:34,057 --> 00:26:33,630 they can maximize training in the 771 00:26:33,630 --> 00:26:35,908 safest possible way for their soldiers , 772 00:26:35,908 --> 00:26:37,797 sailors , airmen , Marine , now , 773 00:26:37,797 --> 00:26:39,797 Marines . That said , As we develop 774 00:26:39,797 --> 00:26:41,630 greater testing capacity , we're 775 00:26:41,630 --> 00:26:43,852 looking at How do we do that ? Uh , how 776 00:26:43,852 --> 00:26:46,650 do we train the force and test the 777 00:26:46,650 --> 00:26:48,960 force based on the tears ? And I spoke 778 00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:51,127 about earlier . It's the tier one with 779 00:26:51,127 --> 00:26:53,182 those top end forces . Then the next 780 00:26:53,182 --> 00:26:55,349 year were deployed forces and so forth 781 00:26:55,349 --> 00:26:57,571 to you get to the bottom that last year 782 00:26:57,571 --> 00:26:59,571 will be , you know , the ah bulk of 783 00:26:59,571 --> 00:27:01,404 your forces who , unless they're 784 00:27:01,404 --> 00:27:03,404 displaying symptoms , we won't test 785 00:27:03,404 --> 00:27:05,571 them . Now . One , the challenges that 786 00:27:05,571 --> 00:27:07,793 we know is asymptomatic transmission of 787 00:27:07,793 --> 00:27:09,960 the disease , and it's something we've 788 00:27:09,960 --> 00:27:12,071 known for quite a while . But what we 789 00:27:12,071 --> 00:27:11,990 didn't really appreciate it for the TR 790 00:27:12,470 --> 00:27:14,610 was the fact that it is that we are 791 00:27:14,610 --> 00:27:16,777 experience very experiencing very high 792 00:27:16,777 --> 00:27:18,832 rates in the military with regard to 793 00:27:18,832 --> 00:27:21,054 asymptomatic transmission . So we gotta 794 00:27:21,054 --> 00:27:23,221 be careful about that . Ensure that if 795 00:27:23,221 --> 00:27:25,443 something happens , we have the medical 796 00:27:25,443 --> 00:27:27,499 capacity to identify those persons , 797 00:27:27,499 --> 00:27:29,554 quarantined them and get them care a 798 00:27:29,554 --> 00:27:31,443 soon as possible . If and as that 799 00:27:31,443 --> 00:27:33,499 happens , and so that's the approach 800 00:27:33,499 --> 00:27:35,610 will taken . You know , the long term 801 00:27:35,610 --> 00:27:37,777 view , which is part of the discussion 802 00:27:37,777 --> 00:27:39,888 here today is , is what do we do over 803 00:27:39,888 --> 00:27:42,110 the next 6 12 18 months ? My view , the 804 00:27:42,110 --> 00:27:44,332 view of the chairman of Joint Chiefs of 805 00:27:44,332 --> 00:27:46,277 Staff of our commanders , civilian 806 00:27:46,277 --> 00:27:48,388 leaders is there will be a new normal 807 00:27:48,388 --> 00:27:50,443 that we will have to adapt to for an 808 00:27:50,443 --> 00:27:52,388 extended period of time , at least 809 00:27:52,388 --> 00:27:54,332 until we have a vaccine that we're 810 00:27:54,332 --> 00:27:56,221 confident in . And that means the 811 00:27:56,221 --> 00:27:56,220 sooner we can adapt our practices , 812 00:27:56,230 --> 00:27:58,452 assumes a sooner we can learn from this 813 00:27:58,452 --> 00:28:01,180 virus and , uh , and make changes , the 814 00:28:01,180 --> 00:28:03,069 better we we will be and the more 815 00:28:03,069 --> 00:28:05,180 likely work to maintain a high degree 816 00:28:05,180 --> 00:28:07,291 of ah , readiness for the force . And 817 00:28:07,291 --> 00:28:09,513 we're looking at all those things right 818 00:28:09,513 --> 00:28:11,513 now before I come back to equipment 819 00:28:11,513 --> 00:28:13,736 including maintenance and acquisition . 820 00:28:13,736 --> 00:28:15,791 I wanted to follow up on a point you 821 00:28:15,791 --> 00:28:15,650 made earlier that the Army itself is 822 00:28:15,650 --> 00:28:17,817 helping for the military . I'm sorry . 823 00:28:17,817 --> 00:28:20,039 More generally is helping with research 824 00:28:20,039 --> 00:28:22,150 on vaccines and other treatments . Is 825 00:28:22,150 --> 00:28:24,150 there anything more you could share 826 00:28:24,150 --> 00:28:26,370 about the details of that ? You know , 827 00:28:26,370 --> 00:28:28,148 I was you , Sam . Rid up it for 828 00:28:28,148 --> 00:28:30,148 Dietrich many , many weeks ago . At 829 00:28:30,148 --> 00:28:32,314 this point time , they were already on 830 00:28:32,314 --> 00:28:34,481 the front end with their public sector 831 00:28:34,481 --> 00:28:36,703 and private sector counterparts working 832 00:28:36,703 --> 00:28:36,660 on vaccines and therapeutics . They 833 00:28:36,660 --> 00:28:38,827 have been on that since then . We have 834 00:28:38,827 --> 00:28:40,993 DARPA engaged , we have other . Walter 835 00:28:40,993 --> 00:28:43,160 Reed is engaged Walter Reed Hospital . 836 00:28:43,160 --> 00:28:45,382 So Ah , we're doing a lot on that . And 837 00:28:45,382 --> 00:28:47,549 we are participating in Operation Warp 838 00:28:47,549 --> 00:28:49,860 speed , if you will , were accelerating 839 00:28:49,870 --> 00:28:51,814 our efforts . I've had a number of 840 00:28:51,814 --> 00:28:53,981 meetings over the past two weeks to to 841 00:28:53,981 --> 00:28:56,360 figure out how we accelerate vaccine 842 00:28:56,360 --> 00:28:58,780 and therapeutic development , testing 843 00:28:58,780 --> 00:29:00,970 and then production , because the 844 00:29:00,970 --> 00:29:03,310 sooner we can get there , the sooner we 845 00:29:03,310 --> 00:29:06,670 can get back to a normal that we all 846 00:29:06,670 --> 00:29:08,837 recognize . And the military is done a 847 00:29:08,837 --> 00:29:10,760 great job in that regard again , 848 00:29:10,770 --> 00:29:12,714 working very close with both their 849 00:29:12,714 --> 00:29:14,770 other public sector counterparts and 850 00:29:14,770 --> 00:29:16,920 the private sector . A couple more 851 00:29:16,930 --> 00:29:20,220 questions on readiness and getting back 852 00:29:20,220 --> 00:29:22,220 to normal . And I want to ask about 853 00:29:22,220 --> 00:29:24,442 equipment You're there . I think at the 854 00:29:24,442 --> 00:29:26,442 Department of Defense today doesn't 855 00:29:26,442 --> 00:29:28,664 look like your living room . And I know 856 00:29:28,664 --> 00:29:30,887 there are some people in the building , 857 00:29:30,887 --> 00:29:33,109 some people at C . I A . Some people at 858 00:29:33,109 --> 00:29:34,942 D I A . A lot of people and four 859 00:29:34,942 --> 00:29:37,109 deployed locations . But do you have a 860 00:29:37,109 --> 00:29:39,280 concept in mind for the people who are 861 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:42,010 handling paperwork but often classified ? 862 00:29:42,350 --> 00:29:44,461 A certain amount of that can't really 863 00:29:44,461 --> 00:29:46,628 be done by tele work . Uh , is there a 864 00:29:46,628 --> 00:29:50,250 concept for how that process plays out 865 00:29:50,260 --> 00:29:51,982 and gradually morphs back into 866 00:29:51,982 --> 00:29:54,140 something that's , Ah , new normal ? 867 00:29:54,160 --> 00:29:56,216 But that preserves enough of what we 868 00:29:56,216 --> 00:29:58,104 used to do that you can really be 869 00:29:58,104 --> 00:30:00,327 effective handling classified documents 870 00:30:00,327 --> 00:30:02,216 and that sort of advance planet ? 871 00:30:02,216 --> 00:30:04,382 Absolutely . I mean , we've been we've 872 00:30:04,382 --> 00:30:06,493 been pleasantly surprised by how much 873 00:30:06,493 --> 00:30:08,438 we've been able to do with when it 874 00:30:08,438 --> 00:30:10,660 comes to tell a work , and in fact , in 875 00:30:10,660 --> 00:30:12,716 some cases we've seen an increase in 876 00:30:12,716 --> 00:30:14,938 productivity in certain areas . When it 877 00:30:14,938 --> 00:30:17,104 comes to tell a work that said for the 878 00:30:17,104 --> 00:30:16,680 past few weeks , our chief management 879 00:30:16,680 --> 00:30:18,736 officer has been developing plans to 880 00:30:18,736 --> 00:30:21,069 reopen the Pentagon and other buildings , 881 00:30:21,069 --> 00:30:23,291 at least in the Washington D . C area . 882 00:30:23,291 --> 00:30:25,291 It will be based on the president's 883 00:30:25,291 --> 00:30:27,458 plan that was and the guidelines given 884 00:30:27,458 --> 00:30:27,350 to him by our public sector experts . 885 00:30:27,820 --> 00:30:30,100 Eso weaken over a period of time in 886 00:30:30,100 --> 00:30:32,700 phases . Open up the Pentagon and other 887 00:30:32,700 --> 00:30:34,756 office buildings like that so we can 888 00:30:34,756 --> 00:30:36,890 again get back to a normal but at the 889 00:30:36,890 --> 00:30:38,890 same time protect our people . That 890 00:30:38,890 --> 00:30:40,834 remains job number one . I've been 891 00:30:40,834 --> 00:30:43,001 saying now for nearly three months . I 892 00:30:43,001 --> 00:30:45,223 have three parties . Number one protect 893 00:30:45,223 --> 00:30:47,446 Our service members are D O D civilians 894 00:30:47,446 --> 00:30:49,540 and their families number to ensure 895 00:30:49,540 --> 00:30:51,429 that we can maintain our national 896 00:30:51,429 --> 00:30:53,373 security capabilities . And number 897 00:30:53,373 --> 00:30:55,596 three provide full support to the whole 898 00:30:55,596 --> 00:30:57,762 nation . Hold a government effort that 899 00:30:57,762 --> 00:30:57,520 has been underway now since at least 900 00:30:57,520 --> 00:30:59,720 for us since January . As you recall , 901 00:30:59,720 --> 00:31:02,430 we opened up our bases in late January 902 00:31:02,430 --> 00:31:05,220 2 Americans returning home from from 903 00:31:05,220 --> 00:31:07,331 China who were brought back by the by 904 00:31:07,331 --> 00:31:09,387 the state apartment other . So we've 905 00:31:09,387 --> 00:31:11,498 been at this now for several months , 906 00:31:11,498 --> 00:31:13,740 and we know what's important . Thank 907 00:31:13,740 --> 00:31:15,518 you . I wanted to ask you about 908 00:31:15,518 --> 00:31:17,684 maintenance you mentioned earlier that 909 00:31:17,684 --> 00:31:19,851 most kinds of training . Most kinds of 910 00:31:19,851 --> 00:31:22,540 maintenance have not been severely 911 00:31:22,560 --> 00:31:24,671 impinged upon , although obviously at 912 00:31:24,671 --> 00:31:26,560 higher echelons , you've got some 913 00:31:26,560 --> 00:31:28,671 concerns that we've been discussing . 914 00:31:28,671 --> 00:31:30,560 But what about the maintenance of 915 00:31:30,560 --> 00:31:29,640 equipment ? One of the great 916 00:31:29,640 --> 00:31:31,862 accomplishments that you've all I think 917 00:31:31,862 --> 00:31:34,890 managed in the last three years and you 918 00:31:34,890 --> 00:31:36,723 know , is partly a reflection of 919 00:31:36,723 --> 00:31:38,557 increased resource is was to get 920 00:31:38,557 --> 00:31:40,660 equipment mission capable rates and 921 00:31:40,660 --> 00:31:42,771 maintain ability rates back to higher 922 00:31:42,771 --> 00:31:44,771 levels . Closer toe . But Secretary 923 00:31:44,771 --> 00:31:47,170 Mattis wanted around 80% for aircraft , 924 00:31:47,180 --> 00:31:49,402 for example . I think you've achieved a 925 00:31:49,402 --> 00:31:51,569 lot of that . Are you able to maintain 926 00:31:51,569 --> 00:31:53,458 that now ? Or are you seeing some 927 00:31:53,458 --> 00:31:55,680 reduction in workflow , whether it's at 928 00:31:55,680 --> 00:31:57,970 the actual depos or even just the spare 929 00:31:57,970 --> 00:32:00,620 parts providers who perhaps are a 930 00:32:00,620 --> 00:32:03,310 contractor or subcontractor level being 931 00:32:03,310 --> 00:32:06,160 affected by the virus more than the big 932 00:32:06,160 --> 00:32:08,100 facilities or the main de of the 933 00:32:08,190 --> 00:32:10,750 operating ? Yes . So again , we've seen 934 00:32:10,750 --> 00:32:12,917 a low impact to date on with regard to 935 00:32:12,917 --> 00:32:14,861 our readiness . But one of the big 936 00:32:14,861 --> 00:32:16,861 areas that I'm watching closely and 937 00:32:16,861 --> 00:32:18,639 we're adapting our plans for is 938 00:32:19,030 --> 00:32:21,530 maintenance and specifically the impact 939 00:32:21,530 --> 00:32:23,363 that Cove in 19 is having on the 940 00:32:23,363 --> 00:32:25,530 defense industrial base , not just for 941 00:32:25,530 --> 00:32:28,500 maintenance , but for production . So 942 00:32:28,510 --> 00:32:30,621 we have a different type of workforce 943 00:32:30,621 --> 00:32:32,954 after than the then the service members . 944 00:32:32,954 --> 00:32:35,177 We have in some ways more susceptible , 945 00:32:35,177 --> 00:32:37,870 more vulnerable to Cove in 19 and , ah , 946 00:32:37,880 --> 00:32:39,936 because we're out in the community . 947 00:32:39,936 --> 00:32:41,880 Some have shut down and we're on a 948 00:32:41,880 --> 00:32:44,102 reduced workload so that obviously over 949 00:32:44,102 --> 00:32:46,436 time will have an impact on maintenance , 950 00:32:46,436 --> 00:32:48,658 whether it's local maintenance or depot 951 00:32:48,658 --> 00:32:50,769 level maintenance , or if you're on a 952 00:32:50,769 --> 00:32:52,713 production line , it could have an 953 00:32:52,713 --> 00:32:54,658 impact there . So Ellen Lord , our 954 00:32:54,658 --> 00:32:56,602 undersecretary for acquisition and 955 00:32:56,602 --> 00:32:58,658 security , she's doing a great job . 956 00:32:58,658 --> 00:32:58,480 She's been very aggressive when it 957 00:32:58,480 --> 00:33:00,680 comes to Ah , working and talking with 958 00:33:00,680 --> 00:33:02,902 the defense industrial base . I will be 959 00:33:02,902 --> 00:33:04,847 sending a letter to them this week 960 00:33:04,847 --> 00:33:06,902 expressing , Ah , my thanks for what 961 00:33:06,902 --> 00:33:09,013 they're doing and offering and asking 962 00:33:09,013 --> 00:33:11,124 them how we can do better in terms of 963 00:33:11,124 --> 00:33:13,069 keeping the dip as we call at full 964 00:33:13,069 --> 00:33:15,013 capacity . It is one of one of our 965 00:33:15,013 --> 00:33:17,236 concerns . We want to work closely with 966 00:33:17,236 --> 00:33:19,402 them , and Ellen's doing a good job in 967 00:33:19,402 --> 00:33:21,402 terms of cash flow , making sure we 968 00:33:21,402 --> 00:33:23,569 keep people on the line working . I've 969 00:33:23,569 --> 00:33:25,847 talked Teoh . I've talked to governors . 970 00:33:25,847 --> 00:33:27,847 I've talked to people in the supply 971 00:33:27,847 --> 00:33:29,569 chain about how we can provide 972 00:33:29,569 --> 00:33:31,624 protective equipment or at least get 973 00:33:31,624 --> 00:33:31,460 them access to it . So all those things 974 00:33:31,460 --> 00:33:33,349 are on the table . That will be a 975 00:33:33,349 --> 00:33:35,349 n'importe factor as we move through 976 00:33:35,349 --> 00:33:37,349 this in the coming months . Is your 977 00:33:37,349 --> 00:33:39,516 greater concern with production at the 978 00:33:39,516 --> 00:33:41,627 subcontractor level as opposed to the 979 00:33:41,627 --> 00:33:43,293 prime ? Because sometimes the 980 00:33:43,293 --> 00:33:45,404 subcontractors are small there in the 981 00:33:45,404 --> 00:33:47,627 community . And if you say a little bit 982 00:33:47,627 --> 00:33:47,150 more about that , and also whether 983 00:33:47,150 --> 00:33:49,317 there are financial mechanisms to help 984 00:33:49,317 --> 00:33:51,539 some of these subcontractors that maybe 985 00:33:51,539 --> 00:33:53,594 some of them should be more aware of 986 00:33:53,594 --> 00:33:55,650 than they've learned so far . Yeah , 987 00:33:55,650 --> 00:33:57,872 absolutely . You know , I worked in the 988 00:33:57,872 --> 00:33:59,928 industry for a few years , so I know 989 00:33:59,928 --> 00:34:01,983 that the further you go out into the 990 00:34:01,983 --> 00:34:04,039 supply chain , the more vulnerable , 991 00:34:04,039 --> 00:34:06,372 the more susceptible your producers are . 992 00:34:06,372 --> 00:34:08,890 Your folks are Teoh . Whether it's a 993 00:34:08,890 --> 00:34:10,946 financial fluctuation in this case , 994 00:34:10,946 --> 00:34:12,946 it's a pandemic , and so we have to 995 00:34:12,946 --> 00:34:15,057 take care of them first and then work 996 00:34:15,057 --> 00:34:17,223 our way back . The bigger companies of 997 00:34:17,223 --> 00:34:19,390 primes , they have the financial means 998 00:34:19,390 --> 00:34:19,190 to sustain themselves and do stuff like 999 00:34:19,190 --> 00:34:21,412 that . It doesn't mean we shouldn't pay 1000 00:34:21,412 --> 00:34:23,634 attention them , but a priority must be 1001 00:34:23,634 --> 00:34:25,579 placed on the furthest end of that 1002 00:34:25,579 --> 00:34:27,634 supply chain first and then work our 1003 00:34:27,634 --> 00:34:27,610 way back in from there because that's 1004 00:34:27,610 --> 00:34:29,777 where you see a lot of vulnerabilities 1005 00:34:29,777 --> 00:34:32,860 where again , cos simply don't have the 1006 00:34:32,870 --> 00:34:35,840 depth of financial , uh , financial 1007 00:34:35,840 --> 00:34:38,062 means or personal where the case may be 1008 00:34:38,062 --> 00:34:39,896 to maintain those those items as 1009 00:34:39,896 --> 00:34:41,729 components that are critical toe 1010 00:34:41,729 --> 00:34:43,784 assembling and bringing together the 1011 00:34:43,784 --> 00:34:45,896 entire product . So far , you haven't 1012 00:34:45,896 --> 00:34:47,784 really had an adverse reaction on 1013 00:34:47,784 --> 00:34:50,007 throughput of final finished products , 1014 00:34:50,007 --> 00:34:51,880 whether it's vehicles , aircraft 1015 00:34:52,110 --> 00:34:54,221 ordinance . But you're concerned that 1016 00:34:54,221 --> 00:34:55,777 there could be some looming 1017 00:34:55,880 --> 00:34:58,180 vulnerabilities because certain kinds 1018 00:34:58,180 --> 00:35:00,180 of component arts perhaps don't get 1019 00:35:00,180 --> 00:35:02,400 produced . That's essentially the the 1020 00:35:02,410 --> 00:35:04,950 crux of the problem . Well , it's it's 1021 00:35:04,950 --> 00:35:06,783 things like that . We've seen it 1022 00:35:06,783 --> 00:35:09,006 acutely here in the past few weeks with 1023 00:35:09,006 --> 00:35:11,228 regard to our supply chain that extends 1024 00:35:11,228 --> 00:35:13,228 into Mexico . Of course , in Mexico 1025 00:35:13,228 --> 00:35:13,210 they shut down a lot of their factories . 1026 00:35:13,570 --> 00:35:15,737 That's been a concern of theirs . Ah , 1027 00:35:15,737 --> 00:35:17,848 again , L Amore has been working with 1028 00:35:17,848 --> 00:35:20,014 her counterparts . She's spoken to the 1029 00:35:20,014 --> 00:35:22,014 U . S . Ambassador of Mexico . I've 1030 00:35:22,014 --> 00:35:23,959 spoken to Secretary Pompeo . We're 1031 00:35:23,959 --> 00:35:25,959 doing everything we can to get that 1032 00:35:25,959 --> 00:35:25,660 line back up , and I'm sure we will 1033 00:35:25,660 --> 00:35:28,380 hear very soon . And that's just a an 1034 00:35:28,380 --> 00:35:30,810 example where the the production line 1035 00:35:30,810 --> 00:35:33,088 extends beyond our borders into Mexico . 1036 00:35:33,350 --> 00:35:35,572 But nonetheless , we still need to keep 1037 00:35:35,572 --> 00:35:37,628 that supply chain moving forward and 1038 00:35:37,628 --> 00:35:39,794 putting stuff through the system so we 1039 00:35:39,794 --> 00:35:41,906 can maintain our either our readiness 1040 00:35:41,906 --> 00:35:43,850 because of maintenance of parts or 1041 00:35:43,850 --> 00:35:45,794 because it's a replacement of news 1042 00:35:45,794 --> 00:35:47,961 entirely . New system It needs to come 1043 00:35:47,961 --> 00:35:50,072 online . I'm starting to get a number 1044 00:35:50,072 --> 00:35:52,183 of questions from viewers , and a few 1045 00:35:52,183 --> 00:35:54,294 of them sort of could be put together 1046 00:35:54,294 --> 00:35:56,406 into one broad question about finance 1047 00:35:56,406 --> 00:35:58,517 for the defense industrial base . And 1048 00:35:58,517 --> 00:36:00,628 so are there any considerations about 1049 00:36:00,628 --> 00:36:02,628 specific needs that you may have to 1050 00:36:02,670 --> 00:36:05,250 focus on Maury either ? Spreading the 1051 00:36:05,250 --> 00:36:07,306 word that certain kinds of loans are 1052 00:36:07,306 --> 00:36:09,361 available , where people may not yet 1053 00:36:09,361 --> 00:36:11,700 know , or getting some help in any kind 1054 00:36:11,700 --> 00:36:13,780 of a future financial relief package 1055 00:36:13,780 --> 00:36:15,947 that has not yet been targeted clearly 1056 00:36:15,947 --> 00:36:18,100 enough on the defense industrial base 1057 00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:20,416 or asking for some more money in the 1058 00:36:20,416 --> 00:36:22,193 supplemental , which is maybe a 1059 00:36:22,193 --> 00:36:24,304 somewhat different question but based 1060 00:36:24,304 --> 00:36:26,082 on different kinds of demands , 1061 00:36:26,082 --> 00:36:28,670 including the 45,000 guardsmen , 1062 00:36:28,670 --> 00:36:30,810 reservists and after duty forces that 1063 00:36:30,810 --> 00:36:32,643 you mentioned around the country 1064 00:36:32,643 --> 00:36:34,588 helping with the domestic response 1065 00:36:34,588 --> 00:36:36,699 today . So in terms of a supplemental 1066 00:36:36,699 --> 00:36:38,866 in terms of another cares act in terms 1067 00:36:38,866 --> 00:36:40,977 of existing funds that people may not 1068 00:36:40,977 --> 00:36:43,088 know about , is there any big message 1069 00:36:43,088 --> 00:36:45,310 that you would want to send out to that 1070 00:36:45,310 --> 00:36:45,070 look ? First thing I'd say is Congress 1071 00:36:45,070 --> 00:36:47,070 has been very generous and at first 1072 00:36:47,070 --> 00:36:49,181 transfer money , giving us what , $11 1073 00:36:49,181 --> 00:36:51,181 billion or so under the Cares Act . 1074 00:36:51,181 --> 00:36:53,348 Teoh do a number of things with regard 1075 00:36:53,348 --> 00:36:53,280 to the Defense industrial base 1076 00:36:53,290 --> 00:36:55,290 Leveraging Defense Production Act , 1077 00:36:55,290 --> 00:36:57,123 which we've done by the way Teoh 1078 00:36:57,123 --> 00:36:59,234 purchase medical supplies , equipment 1079 00:36:59,234 --> 00:37:01,401 and what not ? And we need to continue 1080 00:37:01,401 --> 00:37:03,568 to leverage that money over the coming 1081 00:37:03,568 --> 00:37:05,623 days and weeks again , we're working 1082 00:37:05,623 --> 00:37:08,090 that , but we anticipate the likely 1083 00:37:08,090 --> 00:37:10,201 need for additional monies coming out 1084 00:37:10,201 --> 00:37:12,423 if there is 1/4 supplemental because we 1085 00:37:12,423 --> 00:37:14,646 see again greater demand with regard to 1086 00:37:14,646 --> 00:37:16,868 medical supplies . We also know we need 1087 00:37:16,868 --> 00:37:18,646 to restock our our shells , our 1088 00:37:18,646 --> 00:37:20,590 inventory when it comes to medical 1089 00:37:20,590 --> 00:37:22,646 supplies and equipment . But we also 1090 00:37:22,646 --> 00:37:24,812 want to continue prime ing the defense 1091 00:37:24,812 --> 00:37:26,812 industrial base . We want people at 1092 00:37:26,812 --> 00:37:28,868 work . We want our base at work . We 1093 00:37:28,868 --> 00:37:28,650 want to continue with payments . We 1094 00:37:28,650 --> 00:37:30,872 want to help with cash flow , and we're 1095 00:37:30,872 --> 00:37:32,983 looking at a variety of ways by which 1096 00:37:32,983 --> 00:37:35,206 we can do that . It's again , it's very 1097 00:37:35,206 --> 00:37:37,428 important . This is Ah , you know D o D 1098 00:37:37,428 --> 00:37:39,317 is not an island were really rely 1099 00:37:39,317 --> 00:37:41,483 heavily on the private sector . And so 1100 00:37:41,483 --> 00:37:43,539 many of our private sector workforce 1101 00:37:43,539 --> 00:37:45,428 has been affected by Cove in 19 . 1102 00:37:45,428 --> 00:37:45,200 Either personally , they've been 1103 00:37:45,200 --> 00:37:47,450 infected . Or maybe they're in a state 1104 00:37:47,450 --> 00:37:49,450 where there's a shutdown order . Or 1105 00:37:49,450 --> 00:37:51,450 maybe they're working in such close 1106 00:37:51,450 --> 00:37:53,506 quarters that the management doesn't 1107 00:37:53,506 --> 00:37:55,728 feel comfortable asking to come to work 1108 00:37:55,728 --> 00:37:57,783 because of the conditions . So we're 1109 00:37:57,783 --> 00:37:59,728 trying to work through all those . 1110 00:37:59,728 --> 00:38:01,950 There's , ah , we're looking at him one 1111 00:38:01,950 --> 00:38:04,117 at a time . Ellen Lord's been all over 1112 00:38:04,117 --> 00:38:06,172 this now for many , many weeks , and 1113 00:38:06,172 --> 00:38:08,283 there's more we can do . And we'll do 1114 00:38:08,283 --> 00:38:10,450 as we , uh as we try and plan ahead if 1115 00:38:10,460 --> 00:38:12,571 I want to . Now move to international 1116 00:38:12,571 --> 00:38:14,627 questions where there may be a Covad 1117 00:38:14,627 --> 00:38:16,849 dimension , as with Iran or the U . S . 1118 00:38:16,849 --> 00:38:18,460 Military presence in Iraq or 1119 00:38:18,460 --> 00:38:20,682 Afghanistan . But before I do , because 1120 00:38:20,682 --> 00:38:22,793 we've been talking about the domestic 1121 00:38:22,793 --> 00:38:24,793 home front a bit , I know it's very 1122 00:38:24,793 --> 00:38:26,730 much on your mind . Is there any 1123 00:38:26,740 --> 00:38:29,550 additional concern you have any looming 1124 00:38:29,550 --> 00:38:31,661 need for the Department of Defense to 1125 00:38:31,661 --> 00:38:33,550 do even Maurin the future in some 1126 00:38:33,550 --> 00:38:35,606 domains . The reason , I ask is that 1127 00:38:35,606 --> 00:38:37,550 you mentioned the hospital ships , 1128 00:38:37,550 --> 00:38:39,772 perhaps won't be needed , since some of 1129 00:38:39,772 --> 00:38:41,883 the acute caseload didn't turn out to 1130 00:38:41,883 --> 00:38:43,717 be quite , is great and may have 1131 00:38:43,717 --> 00:38:45,883 already peaked in places like New York 1132 00:38:45,883 --> 00:38:48,050 City . By one concern that some people 1133 00:38:48,050 --> 00:38:49,994 have had is the strength of the US 1134 00:38:49,994 --> 00:38:51,939 police forces around the country , 1135 00:38:51,939 --> 00:38:54,470 where you've already seen 15% attrition 1136 00:38:54,470 --> 00:38:56,880 in New York , 20% in Detroit . I 1137 00:38:56,880 --> 00:38:58,991 shouldn't say attrition . I mean sick 1138 00:38:58,991 --> 00:39:01,213 leave people who either have Kobe it or 1139 00:39:01,213 --> 00:39:02,991 are self quarantining . And the 1140 00:39:02,991 --> 00:39:05,270 question being raised as to whether the 1141 00:39:05,270 --> 00:39:08,140 National Guard in particular , uh , in 1142 00:39:08,140 --> 00:39:10,140 compliance with Posse Comitatus may 1143 00:39:10,140 --> 00:39:12,430 need to go help the police forces in a 1144 00:39:12,430 --> 00:39:14,840 more direct way . That it has so far is 1145 00:39:14,840 --> 00:39:16,840 that kind of conversation happening 1146 00:39:16,850 --> 00:39:18,850 doesn't need to happen . How do you 1147 00:39:18,850 --> 00:39:20,794 view the domestic requirements for 1148 00:39:20,870 --> 00:39:22,870 military assistance in the future ? 1149 00:39:23,220 --> 00:39:25,387 Well , you know , you hit on something 1150 00:39:25,387 --> 00:39:27,442 that's very important again , I said 1151 00:39:27,442 --> 00:39:29,664 earlier , we had 62,000 service members 1152 00:39:29,664 --> 00:39:31,776 out on the streets of America . Right 1153 00:39:31,776 --> 00:39:34,109 now , 45,000 of them are National Guard . 1154 00:39:34,109 --> 00:39:36,276 We're just doing tremendous work . And 1155 00:39:36,276 --> 00:39:38,387 at the peak of ah , of our presence , 1156 00:39:38,387 --> 00:39:40,053 we had well over 4000 medical 1157 00:39:40,053 --> 00:39:43,080 professionals out there way . We were 1158 00:39:43,080 --> 00:39:45,080 very responsive to the needs of the 1159 00:39:45,080 --> 00:39:46,747 state local authorities , and 1160 00:39:46,747 --> 00:39:48,913 eventually we got to the model whereby 1161 00:39:48,913 --> 00:39:51,080 the point you mentioned we saw doctors 1162 00:39:51,080 --> 00:39:53,191 and nurses either getting infected or 1163 00:39:53,191 --> 00:39:55,080 simply worn out because they were 1164 00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:57,080 running 24 hour days for weeks at a 1165 00:39:57,080 --> 00:39:59,247 time . We were able to put our doctors 1166 00:39:59,247 --> 00:40:01,302 and nurses into hospitals and really 1167 00:40:01,302 --> 00:40:03,413 either boost them or substitute for a 1168 00:40:03,413 --> 00:40:05,413 period of time . Second rest up . I 1169 00:40:05,413 --> 00:40:07,580 have not heard that we've reached that 1170 00:40:07,580 --> 00:40:09,858 point yet with the police forces again , 1171 00:40:09,858 --> 00:40:12,080 the National Guard would be well suited 1172 00:40:12,080 --> 00:40:11,520 to do that certainly better than the 1173 00:40:11,520 --> 00:40:13,990 active component for the reasons you 1174 00:40:13,990 --> 00:40:16,212 mentioned . We have not seen that yet , 1175 00:40:16,212 --> 00:40:18,323 but that would be a mission available 1176 00:40:18,323 --> 00:40:20,546 to them , depending on how the governor 1177 00:40:20,546 --> 00:40:22,434 of each respective state wants to 1178 00:40:22,434 --> 00:40:24,379 leverage them . I wanted to pose a 1179 00:40:24,379 --> 00:40:26,490 broad question about how Kobe , 19 is 1180 00:40:26,490 --> 00:40:28,712 affecting potential American threats or 1181 00:40:28,712 --> 00:40:31,210 adversaries , and we know the Pentagon 1182 00:40:31,220 --> 00:40:33,164 for now , 1/2 dozen years has been 1183 00:40:33,164 --> 00:40:35,109 using this so called four plus one 1184 00:40:35,109 --> 00:40:37,240 framework . But you and Secretary 1185 00:40:37,240 --> 00:40:39,351 Mattis and others sort of modified it 1186 00:40:39,351 --> 00:40:41,684 to what some people call two plus three , 1187 00:40:41,684 --> 00:40:43,851 with a focus on Russia and China first 1188 00:40:43,851 --> 00:40:46,430 and then Korea , Iran and terrorism in 1189 00:40:46,430 --> 00:40:48,220 a tear right after that And the 1190 00:40:48,220 --> 00:40:50,276 national defense strategy emphasises 1191 00:40:50,276 --> 00:40:52,498 those kinds of concerns . We've already 1192 00:40:52,498 --> 00:40:54,720 touched a little bit on China today . I 1193 00:40:54,720 --> 00:40:56,831 wanted to ask , in broad terms , have 1194 00:40:56,831 --> 00:40:58,942 you had any comment about what you're 1195 00:40:58,942 --> 00:41:00,609 seeing from those other major 1196 00:41:00,609 --> 00:41:02,609 preoccupations of the Department of 1197 00:41:02,609 --> 00:41:05,240 Defense Russia , North Korea , Iran and 1198 00:41:05,240 --> 00:41:07,351 transnational terrorism ? I think you 1199 00:41:07,351 --> 00:41:09,407 said that terrorism seems unabated , 1200 00:41:09,407 --> 00:41:11,518 hasn't been affected in the intensity 1201 00:41:11,518 --> 00:41:13,629 of various kinds of attacks . But you 1202 00:41:13,629 --> 00:41:15,810 have any high level view or comment 1203 00:41:15,810 --> 00:41:18,190 about the behavior of Russia , North 1204 00:41:18,190 --> 00:41:21,470 Korea and Iran so far ? Sure . Well , I 1205 00:41:21,480 --> 00:41:23,313 think I said upfront . The world 1206 00:41:23,313 --> 00:41:25,424 remains a dangerous place . And ah so 1207 00:41:25,424 --> 00:41:27,258 so many Americans rightly so are 1208 00:41:27,258 --> 00:41:29,313 focused inside these days , even the 1209 00:41:29,313 --> 00:41:31,480 media . But we're still seeing all the 1210 00:41:31,480 --> 00:41:33,702 same bad behavior out there that we saw 1211 00:41:33,702 --> 00:41:35,810 before . Ah , whether it was again , 1212 00:41:35,820 --> 00:41:37,876 the Russians trying to probe our air 1213 00:41:37,876 --> 00:41:40,780 defenses up in Alaska , the Chinese in 1214 00:41:40,780 --> 00:41:42,947 the South China Sea . We're seeing all 1215 00:41:42,947 --> 00:41:45,002 that We in some case , it's a little 1216 00:41:45,002 --> 00:41:47,113 bit more pusher than others and other 1217 00:41:47,113 --> 00:41:49,169 places . We see them , Ah , standing 1218 00:41:49,169 --> 00:41:51,280 down , if you will , because they are 1219 00:41:51,280 --> 00:41:53,391 affected by Cove in 19 as well . It's 1220 00:41:53,391 --> 00:41:55,502 not being reported as much . They are 1221 00:41:55,502 --> 00:41:55,080 not reporting it as much , but we know 1222 00:41:55,080 --> 00:41:57,191 that they're concerned about it . And 1223 00:41:57,191 --> 00:41:59,160 so we're very cautious . We're and 1224 00:41:59,160 --> 00:42:01,382 we're also very conscience conscious of 1225 00:42:01,382 --> 00:42:03,160 what's happening out there . My 1226 00:42:03,160 --> 00:42:05,104 watchword to the force has been to 1227 00:42:05,104 --> 00:42:07,216 remain vigilant . These are uncertain 1228 00:42:07,216 --> 00:42:09,271 times . You don't know how states or 1229 00:42:09,271 --> 00:42:11,216 militaries will act . So we got to 1230 00:42:11,216 --> 00:42:13,382 remain vigilant out there on the front 1231 00:42:13,382 --> 00:42:15,604 lines , and we've commanders completely 1232 00:42:15,604 --> 00:42:17,771 get that I meet with them or talk with 1233 00:42:17,771 --> 00:42:19,993 them weekly about this . And we've done 1234 00:42:19,993 --> 00:42:22,104 everything we can in terms of pushing 1235 00:42:22,104 --> 00:42:22,060 testing supplies , hospitals , doctors 1236 00:42:22,390 --> 00:42:24,557 out to the deployed force to make sure 1237 00:42:24,557 --> 00:42:26,723 they could remain as ready as possible 1238 00:42:26,723 --> 00:42:29,140 to deal with these threats . I want to 1239 00:42:29,140 --> 00:42:31,029 come back to the Middle East in a 1240 00:42:31,029 --> 00:42:33,084 minute where you have of course , so 1241 00:42:33,084 --> 00:42:35,084 many forces deployed . But one more 1242 00:42:35,084 --> 00:42:37,140 question on Russia . If I could just 1243 00:42:37,140 --> 00:42:37,140 now again . And in your opening 1244 00:42:37,140 --> 00:42:39,196 comments , you mentioned the probing 1245 00:42:39,196 --> 00:42:41,362 flights in the northern space and sort 1246 00:42:41,362 --> 00:42:43,560 of on the eastern flank of Russia . 1247 00:42:44,000 --> 00:42:46,167 What about Europe in the Middle East ? 1248 00:42:46,167 --> 00:42:48,389 Which , of course , has been the number 1249 00:42:48,389 --> 00:42:50,389 one source of concern and regard to 1250 00:42:50,389 --> 00:42:52,389 Russian behavior , especially since 1251 00:42:52,389 --> 00:42:54,650 2014 . And some people , some of the 1252 00:42:54,680 --> 00:42:57,200 audience today has asked about Defender 1253 00:42:57,200 --> 00:43:00,000 2020 and any kinds of exercises that 1254 00:43:00,220 --> 00:43:02,331 we've planned that may now have to be 1255 00:43:02,331 --> 00:43:04,220 curtailed or postponed , and your 1256 00:43:04,220 --> 00:43:06,276 overall sense of our preparedness in 1257 00:43:06,276 --> 00:43:08,550 Europe specifically in regards to 1258 00:43:08,550 --> 00:43:11,000 Russia and its potential provocation . 1259 00:43:11,000 --> 00:43:13,056 So it's a two part question . Do you 1260 00:43:13,056 --> 00:43:15,111 see more provocations ? And you have 1261 00:43:15,111 --> 00:43:17,278 worries about our preparedness in that 1262 00:43:17,278 --> 00:43:19,500 particular theater ? You know , there's 1263 00:43:19,500 --> 00:43:21,667 I wouldn't say There's been a material 1264 00:43:21,667 --> 00:43:23,722 increase in provocations , you see . 1265 00:43:23,722 --> 00:43:25,611 Certainly the Chinese have been a 1266 00:43:25,611 --> 00:43:27,833 little bit more aggressive out there in 1267 00:43:27,833 --> 00:43:30,000 the in the Pacific . The Russians rain 1268 00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:32,111 busy . Ah , in Libya , of course , in 1269 00:43:32,111 --> 00:43:34,111 Syria , places like that . But I'll 1270 00:43:34,111 --> 00:43:36,167 tell you , with regard to NATO , the 1271 00:43:36,167 --> 00:43:38,290 alliance is held strong . We've I've 1272 00:43:38,290 --> 00:43:41,510 talked to many of my counterparts from 1273 00:43:41,520 --> 00:43:43,742 Europe about their state of readiness . 1274 00:43:43,742 --> 00:43:45,853 How we can help them , etcetera . But 1275 00:43:45,853 --> 00:43:48,076 over the last few years , I think we've 1276 00:43:48,076 --> 00:43:49,970 seen NATO readiness increase . 1277 00:43:50,510 --> 00:43:52,843 President Trump has been very insistent , 1278 00:43:52,843 --> 00:43:55,010 as have I've been that they contribute 1279 00:43:55,010 --> 00:43:57,010 more to defense , get above that 2% 1280 00:43:57,010 --> 00:43:59,350 threshold . And they have , uh , sack 1281 00:43:59,350 --> 00:44:01,270 your a supreme Allied commander . 1282 00:44:01,270 --> 00:44:03,790 Europe has made ah , NATO readiness 1283 00:44:03,800 --> 00:44:06,022 initiative a priority , which I have as 1284 00:44:06,022 --> 00:44:07,856 well . That's 30 battalions , 30 1285 00:44:07,856 --> 00:44:10,078 squadrons , 30 naval ships ready within 1286 00:44:10,078 --> 00:44:11,967 30 days . We've seen an uptick in 1287 00:44:11,967 --> 00:44:14,022 readiness there . So I think overall 1288 00:44:14,022 --> 00:44:16,189 the trend for NATO rightness have been 1289 00:44:16,189 --> 00:44:18,244 positive in terms of both capacity , 1290 00:44:18,244 --> 00:44:20,411 capability and the ability to deployed 1291 00:44:20,411 --> 00:44:22,870 in a timely manner . And so , uh , so 1292 00:44:22,870 --> 00:44:24,981 all all that is trending well at this 1293 00:44:24,981 --> 00:44:27,770 point in time . And , um , that's 1294 00:44:27,770 --> 00:44:29,992 generally where we see things right now 1295 00:44:31,090 --> 00:44:33,170 on Iran , we know that Iraq has been 1296 00:44:33,170 --> 00:44:36,240 extremely hard hit by Kobe 19 1297 00:44:36,250 --> 00:44:38,530 internally . It's also obviously been 1298 00:44:38,530 --> 00:44:40,980 pressured by the U . S led sanctions 1299 00:44:41,020 --> 00:44:44,540 regimen . And yet , of course , Iran 1300 00:44:44,720 --> 00:44:47,330 tends to conduct activities that are 1301 00:44:47,340 --> 00:44:49,062 often covert , not always that 1302 00:44:49,062 --> 00:44:51,229 expensive . And I want to ask you in a 1303 00:44:51,229 --> 00:44:53,507 minute about Iran and Iraq . But first , 1304 00:44:53,507 --> 00:44:56,250 if I could focus directly on Iran . We 1305 00:44:56,250 --> 00:44:58,650 know that there have been some concerns 1306 00:44:58,650 --> 00:45:01,370 about Iranian gunboats . Provocations 1307 00:45:01,370 --> 00:45:03,426 in the Persian Gulf . Peace would be 1308 00:45:03,426 --> 00:45:05,537 the U . S . Navy . Are you seeing any 1309 00:45:05,537 --> 00:45:07,759 change in activity there ? You have any 1310 00:45:07,759 --> 00:45:09,759 concern that Iran , perhaps because 1311 00:45:09,759 --> 00:45:11,926 it's getting backed into a corner , so 1312 00:45:11,926 --> 00:45:13,926 to speak , with its economy in such 1313 00:45:13,926 --> 00:45:16,037 dire straits , its health care system 1314 00:45:16,037 --> 00:45:18,203 in such dire straits is doing the only 1315 00:45:18,203 --> 00:45:18,180 thing that Iran knows how to do ? Which 1316 00:45:18,180 --> 00:45:21,200 is the lash out ? Well , Iran has been 1317 00:45:21,200 --> 00:45:23,422 hit very hard by the krona virus . Um , 1318 00:45:23,422 --> 00:45:25,367 and it's it's had an impact on the 1319 00:45:25,367 --> 00:45:28,540 economy on society . And , as we've 1320 00:45:28,540 --> 00:45:30,540 been saying , Look , if if they pay 1321 00:45:30,540 --> 00:45:32,762 more attention to their people , divert 1322 00:45:32,762 --> 00:45:34,873 their funds to helping the population 1323 00:45:34,873 --> 00:45:36,929 instead of funding malign activities 1324 00:45:36,929 --> 00:45:38,929 from Africa all the way through the 1325 00:45:38,929 --> 00:45:41,040 Middle East , whether it's or funding 1326 00:45:41,040 --> 00:45:43,096 Shia militia groups , uh , providing 1327 00:45:43,096 --> 00:45:45,262 rockets and missiles and ammunition to 1328 00:45:45,262 --> 00:45:47,373 the Houthi rebels if they focus their 1329 00:45:47,373 --> 00:45:49,596 attention resource is under people . It 1330 00:45:49,596 --> 00:45:51,651 could be a much better place for the 1331 00:45:51,651 --> 00:45:51,390 Iranians , the running people 1332 00:45:51,390 --> 00:45:53,557 themselves . But instead they continue 1333 00:45:53,557 --> 00:45:55,668 this blind behavior that they've been 1334 00:45:55,668 --> 00:45:57,834 up to now for what , 41 years and that 1335 00:45:57,834 --> 00:46:00,080 continues despite the impact of 1336 00:46:00,080 --> 00:46:02,210 sanctions , despite the impact of the 1337 00:46:02,210 --> 00:46:04,630 Corona virus . In spite of all those 1338 00:46:04,630 --> 00:46:06,741 things and by the way we , the United 1339 00:46:06,741 --> 00:46:08,686 States , have offered to help them 1340 00:46:08,686 --> 00:46:10,797 provide medical supplies and what not 1341 00:46:10,797 --> 00:46:10,570 and they've they've turned that down . 1342 00:46:10,570 --> 00:46:13,750 So you know , my my hope would be that 1343 00:46:13,750 --> 00:46:16,028 they would focus on the Iranian people , 1344 00:46:16,028 --> 00:46:18,083 try and help them through this . Try 1345 00:46:18,083 --> 00:46:20,083 and provide the Iranian people that 1346 00:46:20,083 --> 00:46:22,028 testing the medical supplies , the 1347 00:46:22,028 --> 00:46:23,861 proper policies they need to get 1348 00:46:23,861 --> 00:46:25,806 through this because those are the 1349 00:46:25,806 --> 00:46:28,028 folks who are suffering right now . And 1350 00:46:28,028 --> 00:46:30,250 let me now ask about Iran's role inside 1351 00:46:30,250 --> 00:46:32,361 Iraq . And of course , there's been a 1352 00:46:32,361 --> 00:46:34,361 lot of news in Iraq in the last few 1353 00:46:34,361 --> 00:46:36,472 months , and it almost seems like the 1354 00:46:36,472 --> 00:46:38,639 world moves so fast these days that we 1355 00:46:38,639 --> 00:46:40,806 just forget the seismic developments . 1356 00:46:40,806 --> 00:46:42,861 And they were all sorts of different 1357 00:46:42,861 --> 00:46:45,040 types of developments everything from 1358 00:46:45,260 --> 00:46:47,120 Iraqi protests against their own 1359 00:46:47,120 --> 00:46:49,320 political leaders , partly due toa 1360 00:46:49,500 --> 00:46:51,333 economic molests , partly due to 1361 00:46:51,333 --> 00:46:53,480 concern that the Iraqis Iraqi 1362 00:46:53,480 --> 00:46:55,424 leadership was too close to Iran . 1363 00:46:55,424 --> 00:46:57,536 People didn't like that . We saw some 1364 00:46:57,536 --> 00:46:59,702 sniper activity . Perhaps some of that 1365 00:46:59,702 --> 00:47:01,813 was Iranian sponsored . Then we saw , 1366 00:47:01,813 --> 00:47:04,036 of course , United States , retaliating 1367 00:47:04,036 --> 00:47:05,980 against a militia groups that were 1368 00:47:05,980 --> 00:47:08,320 instrumental in shelling our bases . 1369 00:47:08,560 --> 00:47:10,616 That led , of course , to a back and 1370 00:47:10,616 --> 00:47:12,616 forth . And we have the sole Ahmadi 1371 00:47:12,616 --> 00:47:14,449 killing one of the more dramatic 1372 00:47:14,449 --> 00:47:16,671 developments in Middle Eastern security 1373 00:47:16,671 --> 00:47:18,893 politics in recent years . But it seems 1374 00:47:18,893 --> 00:47:21,116 like the conversation about that lasted 1375 00:47:21,116 --> 00:47:20,670 for about a week before we moved on to 1376 00:47:20,670 --> 00:47:22,892 other things . There's been a lot going 1377 00:47:22,892 --> 00:47:25,059 on , and I wondered how you would take 1378 00:47:25,059 --> 00:47:27,260 stock of the situation today . The 1379 00:47:27,260 --> 00:47:29,810 Iraqis , they're still trying to put 1380 00:47:29,810 --> 00:47:31,810 together a new government . They're 1381 00:47:31,810 --> 00:47:34,032 still trying to figure out if they want 1382 00:47:34,032 --> 00:47:36,143 us to stay , which is a decision they 1383 00:47:36,143 --> 00:47:38,310 can't really make until they stabilize 1384 00:47:38,310 --> 00:47:40,199 that new government . We're still 1385 00:47:40,199 --> 00:47:40,010 figuring out if we can protect our 1386 00:47:40,010 --> 00:47:42,010 forces better . If the Iraqis don't 1387 00:47:42,010 --> 00:47:44,240 help us enough protecting our own key 1388 00:47:44,240 --> 00:47:46,351 facilities . What's the state of play 1389 00:47:46,351 --> 00:47:49,150 right now as we get into May 2020 U . S 1390 00:47:49,150 --> 00:47:52,560 forces in Iraq ? Well , you've covered 1391 00:47:52,560 --> 00:47:54,727 a lot of train there . Let me just say 1392 00:47:54,727 --> 00:47:56,616 this up front . The United States 1393 00:47:56,616 --> 00:47:58,671 policy remains unchanged . We really 1394 00:47:58,671 --> 00:48:01,340 want Iraq to be a secure , 1395 00:48:01,970 --> 00:48:05,610 prosperous and sovereign country , and 1396 00:48:05,620 --> 00:48:07,830 and we're willing to support them in 1397 00:48:07,830 --> 00:48:09,719 any way we can to do that . We're 1398 00:48:09,719 --> 00:48:11,719 committed to the enduring defeat of 1399 00:48:11,719 --> 00:48:13,774 Isis , which means providing train , 1400 00:48:13,774 --> 00:48:15,830 advise and assist and those types of 1401 00:48:15,830 --> 00:48:17,997 things . But the fact is , the Iranian 1402 00:48:17,997 --> 00:48:20,108 government has its tentacles into the 1403 00:48:20,108 --> 00:48:22,219 Iraqi government . At a time when you 1404 00:48:22,219 --> 00:48:22,070 and it's been that way for a number of 1405 00:48:22,070 --> 00:48:24,181 years , it seems like it is escalated 1406 00:48:24,181 --> 00:48:26,070 at this point in time . The Iraqi 1407 00:48:26,070 --> 00:48:28,181 government is struggling because they 1408 00:48:28,181 --> 00:48:30,870 cannot form themselves . You have a new 1409 00:48:30,870 --> 00:48:32,981 designated prime minister , is trying 1410 00:48:32,981 --> 00:48:35,037 to pull a government together . He's 1411 00:48:35,037 --> 00:48:37,520 being influenced by Iranian by Iran or 1412 00:48:37,520 --> 00:48:39,650 Iranian proxies through the Shia 1413 00:48:39,650 --> 00:48:41,872 militia groups . And at the same time , 1414 00:48:41,872 --> 00:48:43,983 you know , do the collapse of Ah , of 1415 00:48:43,983 --> 00:48:45,983 the oil , the price of oil . You've 1416 00:48:45,983 --> 00:48:48,150 seen a collapse in their revenues , so 1417 00:48:48,150 --> 00:48:50,372 it's a tough time for the Iraqis . Uh , 1418 00:48:50,372 --> 00:48:52,317 again , what we want to see is the 1419 00:48:52,317 --> 00:48:54,483 Iraqi people and enjoy the sovereignty 1420 00:48:54,483 --> 00:48:56,428 that they that they want that they 1421 00:48:56,428 --> 00:48:58,594 desire as you've seen the Iraqi people 1422 00:48:58,594 --> 00:49:00,650 out in the streets . It's been about 1423 00:49:00,650 --> 00:49:00,600 two things . Corruption and the 1424 00:49:00,600 --> 00:49:02,656 influence of Iran in their country , 1425 00:49:02,820 --> 00:49:04,931 and we want to do what we can to help 1426 00:49:04,931 --> 00:49:06,820 them get through that and get and 1427 00:49:06,820 --> 00:49:08,764 become a sovereign , independent , 1428 00:49:08,764 --> 00:49:10,653 prosperous nation . We still have 1429 00:49:10,653 --> 00:49:12,876 roughly 5000 U . S forces in Iraq , but 1430 00:49:12,876 --> 00:49:14,764 they're consolidated in a smaller 1431 00:49:14,764 --> 00:49:16,598 number of bases . Is that a fair 1432 00:49:16,598 --> 00:49:18,653 summary of how things had evolved in 1433 00:49:18,653 --> 00:49:18,620 the last few months ? Well , we have an 1434 00:49:18,620 --> 00:49:20,731 obligation in sure we can protect our 1435 00:49:20,731 --> 00:49:22,787 people . And , as we've seen again , 1436 00:49:22,787 --> 00:49:24,898 Iranian malign activity in the area , 1437 00:49:24,898 --> 00:49:27,120 particular in particularly in Iraq , we 1438 00:49:27,120 --> 00:49:29,240 know that Iran continues toe in one 1439 00:49:29,240 --> 00:49:31,730 degree or another , Teoh fund or 1440 00:49:31,730 --> 00:49:35,300 resource or direct or ah uh , 1441 00:49:35,310 --> 00:49:37,660 somehow shape the behaviour and actions 1442 00:49:37,670 --> 00:49:40,010 of Shia militia groups in that country , 1443 00:49:40,050 --> 00:49:42,660 and that is a threat to us . It's a 1444 00:49:42,660 --> 00:49:44,493 threat that , actually the Iraqi 1445 00:49:44,493 --> 00:49:46,438 government is responsible for . It 1446 00:49:46,438 --> 00:49:48,660 needs to take take response it needs to 1447 00:49:48,660 --> 00:49:50,604 take control of , and I talk to my 1448 00:49:50,604 --> 00:49:52,827 counterpart about it as as the chairman 1449 00:49:52,827 --> 00:49:54,993 of Joint Chiefs of Staff . But again , 1450 00:49:54,993 --> 00:49:57,104 when you have a government struggling 1451 00:49:57,104 --> 00:49:59,104 to form itself and to get control , 1452 00:49:59,104 --> 00:50:01,271 it's hard for them to do that . And so 1453 00:50:01,271 --> 00:50:01,250 we have consolidated in hard in our 1454 00:50:01,250 --> 00:50:04,270 positions , and , um , again we support 1455 00:50:04,560 --> 00:50:06,504 Iraq's sovereignty . We got to see 1456 00:50:06,504 --> 00:50:08,560 where that government would come out 1457 00:50:08,560 --> 00:50:10,727 and what the future of our presence in 1458 00:50:10,727 --> 00:50:13,060 Iraq will look like in the months ahead . 1459 00:50:13,060 --> 00:50:12,780 So in a minute or two , I want to 1460 00:50:12,790 --> 00:50:15,260 finish up on the broader question of 1461 00:50:15,260 --> 00:50:17,371 the national defense strategy and the 1462 00:50:17,371 --> 00:50:19,649 implementation of that . And of course , 1463 00:50:19,649 --> 00:50:21,760 that is partly related to Kobe 19 but 1464 00:50:21,760 --> 00:50:23,816 also largely separate from Kobe 19 . 1465 00:50:23,900 --> 00:50:26,122 But before I do , I I want to ask about 1466 00:50:26,122 --> 00:50:28,289 Afghanistan , and I realized this is a 1467 00:50:28,289 --> 00:50:30,480 complicated question because I'm 1468 00:50:30,560 --> 00:50:32,560 inevitably going to be asking you a 1469 00:50:32,560 --> 00:50:34,727 question that touches on diplomacy and 1470 00:50:34,727 --> 00:50:36,893 the peace process in Afghanistan . But 1471 00:50:36,893 --> 00:50:39,060 there is , I think , at the moment , a 1472 00:50:39,060 --> 00:50:40,949 little bit of confusion , perhaps 1473 00:50:40,949 --> 00:50:43,116 intentional and perhaps even desirable 1474 00:50:43,180 --> 00:50:45,291 about exactly what U s policy towards 1475 00:50:45,291 --> 00:50:48,070 Afghanistan would be if the peace 1476 00:50:48,070 --> 00:50:50,220 process with the Taliban and the 1477 00:50:50,220 --> 00:50:52,450 government led team of , you know , 1478 00:50:52,460 --> 00:50:55,040 bullet political actors , NGOs , civil 1479 00:50:55,040 --> 00:50:57,360 society that these process continues to 1480 00:50:57,360 --> 00:50:59,370 stay bogged down . If the Afghan 1481 00:50:59,370 --> 00:51:01,481 government can't even decide on , you 1482 00:51:01,481 --> 00:51:03,648 know how they're gonna structure power 1483 00:51:03,648 --> 00:51:06,070 sharing between the top two individuals . 1484 00:51:06,520 --> 00:51:08,742 And if there is an uptick in violence , 1485 00:51:08,742 --> 00:51:10,964 especially by the Taliban , against the 1486 00:51:10,964 --> 00:51:13,270 Afghan police and army , and there is 1487 00:51:13,740 --> 00:51:17,280 really no headway on seeing even the 1488 00:51:17,280 --> 00:51:19,680 beginning of , ah promising negotiation . 1489 00:51:20,160 --> 00:51:22,550 Are we really gonna leave next year 1490 00:51:22,560 --> 00:51:25,340 according to the current plan ? Or is 1491 00:51:25,340 --> 00:51:28,240 there enough play in the deal that's 1492 00:51:28,240 --> 00:51:30,240 been discussed , negotiated and the 1493 00:51:30,240 --> 00:51:32,240 understanding of that deal that the 1494 00:51:32,240 --> 00:51:34,407 United States still reserves the right 1495 00:51:34,407 --> 00:51:36,462 to say , Listen , the Taliban is not 1496 00:51:36,462 --> 00:51:38,573 negotiating in good faith , and we're 1497 00:51:38,573 --> 00:51:40,740 going to rethink our commitments . 1498 00:51:40,750 --> 00:51:42,806 Certainly we're going to rethink the 1499 00:51:42,806 --> 00:51:44,917 idea of getting out altogether . Come 1500 00:51:44,917 --> 00:51:47,020 2021 . Any comment on that broader 1501 00:51:47,020 --> 00:51:49,187 situation , which , of course , now is 1502 00:51:49,187 --> 00:51:51,409 complicated by covert as well . I don't 1503 00:51:51,409 --> 00:51:53,576 know if it's complicated in a way that 1504 00:51:53,576 --> 00:51:56,090 makes the fighting over time likely to 1505 00:51:56,090 --> 00:51:58,630 diminish because people get sick . But 1506 00:51:58,630 --> 00:52:00,908 so far at least , we've seen no report . 1507 00:52:00,908 --> 00:52:02,797 I don't think of any reduction in 1508 00:52:02,797 --> 00:52:05,074 violence so over to you , Mr Secretary . 1509 00:52:05,210 --> 00:52:07,321 Yes , let's go back to the basics and 1510 00:52:07,321 --> 00:52:10,370 the basics of this , that our goal 1511 00:52:10,370 --> 00:52:13,040 remains that we do know do not want 1512 00:52:13,050 --> 00:52:15,990 Afghanistan ever become a safe haven 1513 00:52:15,990 --> 00:52:17,879 for terrorists who can attack the 1514 00:52:17,879 --> 00:52:19,879 United States . That's number one . 1515 00:52:19,879 --> 00:52:22,046 Number two is . We also know that this 1516 00:52:22,046 --> 00:52:24,840 conflict between the Taliban and the 1517 00:52:24,850 --> 00:52:26,961 Afghan government . It's not gonna be 1518 00:52:26,961 --> 00:52:29,128 won on the battlefield . There's not a 1519 00:52:29,128 --> 00:52:31,239 military solution . We have to have a 1520 00:52:31,239 --> 00:52:33,461 political solution to this . And that's 1521 00:52:33,461 --> 00:52:35,517 the process that we set up the peace 1522 00:52:35,517 --> 00:52:37,628 agreement that we arranged between us 1523 00:52:37,628 --> 00:52:39,683 and the Taliban that eventually will 1524 00:52:39,683 --> 00:52:41,961 lead to an intern . Afghan negotiation . 1525 00:52:41,961 --> 00:52:44,072 That is the best path forward for all 1526 00:52:44,072 --> 00:52:46,128 parties , particularly Afghan people 1527 00:52:46,128 --> 00:52:48,294 who have suffered eso horribly now for 1528 00:52:48,294 --> 00:52:50,350 for 1920 years . So that is the path 1529 00:52:50,350 --> 00:52:53,200 we're on . It's clear to say that that 1530 00:52:53,200 --> 00:52:55,144 path has been long and winding and 1531 00:52:55,144 --> 00:52:57,256 bumpy , and it's behind schedule , if 1532 00:52:57,256 --> 00:52:59,660 you will . We continue to talk to both 1533 00:52:59,660 --> 00:53:02,430 sides about what they need to do . Teoh 1534 00:53:02,730 --> 00:53:05,860 to fully implement the agreement . The , 1535 00:53:05,870 --> 00:53:08,037 uh , there has not been a reduction of 1536 00:53:08,037 --> 00:53:09,926 violence , if you will , from the 1537 00:53:09,926 --> 00:53:12,148 Taliban side . On the other hand , they 1538 00:53:12,148 --> 00:53:14,120 have not attacked us or attack the 1539 00:53:14,130 --> 00:53:16,590 major metro much politan areas on the 1540 00:53:16,590 --> 00:53:18,590 other side . The Afghan government 1541 00:53:18,590 --> 00:53:20,940 needs to organize itself and reach 1542 00:53:20,940 --> 00:53:23,051 agreement . We understand . Right now 1543 00:53:23,051 --> 00:53:24,996 there is , ah , possible new power 1544 00:53:24,996 --> 00:53:27,051 sharing agreement coming out between 1545 00:53:27,051 --> 00:53:28,773 Abdullah and Ghani . If that's 1546 00:53:28,773 --> 00:53:30,662 successful , then we could Forman 1547 00:53:30,662 --> 00:53:32,662 interact an Afghan negotiating team 1548 00:53:32,662 --> 00:53:34,718 with the consent . Sit down with the 1549 00:53:34,718 --> 00:53:36,662 With the Taliban . We've seen some 1550 00:53:36,662 --> 00:53:38,996 exchanges of prisoners , but not enough . 1551 00:53:38,996 --> 00:53:40,940 But we need to get this process on 1552 00:53:40,940 --> 00:53:42,940 track . That is the way forward the 1553 00:53:42,940 --> 00:53:42,700 United States will continue . Teoh 1554 00:53:43,250 --> 00:53:45,361 support our Afghan partners . In that 1555 00:53:45,361 --> 00:53:47,472 process we have in their defense . We 1556 00:53:47,472 --> 00:53:49,583 have conducted counterstrikes against 1557 00:53:49,583 --> 00:53:51,694 the Taliban , and we will continue to 1558 00:53:51,694 --> 00:53:53,917 do that as well . But at the end of day 1559 00:53:53,917 --> 00:53:52,740 again , we want to make sure 1560 00:53:52,740 --> 00:53:54,962 Afghanistan has not become a safe haven 1561 00:53:54,962 --> 00:53:56,907 for terrorists . We're comfortably 1562 00:53:56,907 --> 00:53:58,851 comfortable . We can get down to a 1563 00:53:58,851 --> 00:54:00,962 lower number number and still do that 1564 00:54:00,962 --> 00:54:03,018 and still adhere to the terms of the 1565 00:54:03,018 --> 00:54:05,073 agreement . And then from there will 1566 00:54:05,073 --> 00:54:04,650 make decisions that are conditions 1567 00:54:04,650 --> 00:54:08,540 based . Very good , thank you . Just a 1568 00:54:08,540 --> 00:54:10,790 couple more questions . And they relate 1569 00:54:10,790 --> 00:54:13,150 again to the national defense strategy , 1570 00:54:13,150 --> 00:54:15,600 great power competition and the path 1571 00:54:15,600 --> 00:54:17,830 forward more generally . So I guess I 1572 00:54:17,830 --> 00:54:19,830 could just put this in broad . That 1573 00:54:19,830 --> 00:54:21,886 picture turns anything of particular 1574 00:54:21,886 --> 00:54:24,108 note that you would want to say whether 1575 00:54:24,108 --> 00:54:26,330 it's technologies that air showing more 1576 00:54:26,330 --> 00:54:28,274 promise , as John Allen alluded to 1577 00:54:28,274 --> 00:54:30,330 earlier that you've been pushing and 1578 00:54:30,330 --> 00:54:32,552 championing in your job , whether it is 1579 00:54:32,552 --> 00:54:34,552 any kind of other innovation in the 1580 00:54:34,552 --> 00:54:36,719 force that you're seeing that you want 1581 00:54:36,719 --> 00:54:38,608 us to be aware of and remember is 1582 00:54:38,608 --> 00:54:40,830 ongoing . Anything else beyond the sort 1583 00:54:40,830 --> 00:54:43,052 of immediate crisis management and Kobe 1584 00:54:43,052 --> 00:54:45,163 19 dimensions of the national defense 1585 00:54:45,163 --> 00:54:47,219 strategy , it's probably too soon to 1586 00:54:47,219 --> 00:54:49,219 know there's gonna be any effect on 1587 00:54:49,219 --> 00:54:52,070 your budget , very up line from all of 1588 00:54:52,070 --> 00:54:54,470 the developments in the world in 2020 1589 00:54:54,640 --> 00:54:56,807 not to mention a presidential election 1590 00:54:56,807 --> 00:54:58,807 in November , but certainly the way 1591 00:54:58,807 --> 00:55:00,918 Kobe it is affecting our GDP . Growth 1592 00:55:00,918 --> 00:55:03,029 rates , our debt , everything else is 1593 00:55:03,029 --> 00:55:05,140 gonna presumably be debated at length 1594 00:55:05,140 --> 00:55:07,251 in the months and years ahead . But I 1595 00:55:07,251 --> 00:55:09,418 assume you don't have any change yet , 1596 00:55:09,418 --> 00:55:11,584 and you're expected top line . Did you 1597 00:55:11,584 --> 00:55:13,807 confirm that and then say anything else 1598 00:55:13,807 --> 00:55:15,973 you would like to about implementation 1599 00:55:15,973 --> 00:55:18,140 of the national strategy ? Well , when 1600 00:55:18,140 --> 00:55:17,910 I came in , officers said , my top 1601 00:55:17,910 --> 00:55:19,966 party would be implementation of the 1602 00:55:19,966 --> 00:55:22,077 national defense strategy , and we've 1603 00:55:22,077 --> 00:55:24,243 been working pretty hard on that now , 1604 00:55:24,243 --> 00:55:26,299 in the 11 months , months or so that 1605 00:55:26,299 --> 00:55:26,000 I've been secretary defense and I'll 1606 00:55:26,000 --> 00:55:28,230 talk about those some of those things 1607 00:55:28,230 --> 00:55:30,397 much . Much of it goes unreported , if 1608 00:55:30,397 --> 00:55:32,452 you will , on the top line I've said 1609 00:55:32,452 --> 00:55:34,508 that we need if we're gonna continue 1610 00:55:34,508 --> 00:55:36,619 toe to increase readiness , make this 1611 00:55:36,619 --> 00:55:38,841 shift to implement the NDS , etcetera . 1612 00:55:38,841 --> 00:55:40,897 We need a 3 to 5% annual real growth 1613 00:55:40,897 --> 00:55:42,952 year over year . I am concerned , of 1614 00:55:42,952 --> 00:55:45,530 course , at the , uh , the massive 1615 00:55:45,530 --> 00:55:47,760 infusion of dollars into the into the 1616 00:55:47,760 --> 00:55:49,538 economy by the Congress and the 1617 00:55:49,538 --> 00:55:51,660 executive branch nearly $3 trillion . 1618 00:55:52,040 --> 00:55:55,170 Ah may throw us off that course , if 1619 00:55:55,170 --> 00:55:57,170 you will , because we all recognize 1620 00:55:57,170 --> 00:55:59,281 that the United States says it has an 1621 00:55:59,281 --> 00:56:01,503 enormous death and we have to deal with 1622 00:56:01,503 --> 00:56:03,559 that too . And so there is a concern 1623 00:56:03,559 --> 00:56:05,559 there that that may lead to smaller 1624 00:56:05,559 --> 00:56:07,726 defense budgets in the future , at the 1625 00:56:07,726 --> 00:56:09,614 critical time at which we need to 1626 00:56:09,614 --> 00:56:11,726 continue making this adjustment where 1627 00:56:11,726 --> 00:56:13,726 we look at China than Russia as our 1628 00:56:13,726 --> 00:56:15,892 long term strategic competitors . That 1629 00:56:15,892 --> 00:56:17,892 means shedding the legacy force and 1630 00:56:17,892 --> 00:56:19,892 moving to a more modern force , and 1631 00:56:19,892 --> 00:56:21,781 that more modern force looks like 1632 00:56:21,781 --> 00:56:24,280 completely revitalized strategic forces . 1633 00:56:24,530 --> 00:56:26,586 And as you know , we're we're , ah , 1634 00:56:27,290 --> 00:56:29,123 rebuilding all three legs of the 1635 00:56:29,123 --> 00:56:31,170 nuclear triad , whether it's the ah 1636 00:56:31,180 --> 00:56:33,400 ground based strategic deterrent , the 1637 00:56:33,410 --> 00:56:36,030 new ah SSB ends or long range strategic 1638 00:56:36,030 --> 00:56:38,110 bombers . But we're also investing a 1639 00:56:38,110 --> 00:56:41,030 lot of money into a I into hyper sonics 1640 00:56:41,290 --> 00:56:43,540 into our space capabilities into cyber 1641 00:56:44,180 --> 00:56:46,950 into directed energy , all types of 1642 00:56:46,950 --> 00:56:49,240 things that will continue at the same 1643 00:56:49,240 --> 00:56:51,407 time . Michael , Last summer we kicked 1644 00:56:51,407 --> 00:56:53,518 off and we just had an update on that 1645 00:56:53,518 --> 00:56:55,573 last month . A new joint warfighting 1646 00:56:55,573 --> 00:56:57,710 concept that will that is , the 1647 00:56:57,710 --> 00:56:59,900 successor to air land battle that will 1648 00:56:59,900 --> 00:57:01,956 make sure that we're fighting in all 1649 00:57:01,956 --> 00:57:04,122 domains as a coherent , cohesive joint 1650 00:57:04,122 --> 00:57:06,830 force . We have new plans to reach out 1651 00:57:06,830 --> 00:57:08,830 to our allies and partners and make 1652 00:57:08,830 --> 00:57:10,941 sure they're well integrated into all 1653 00:57:10,941 --> 00:57:12,830 of our efforts . Um , there are a 1654 00:57:12,830 --> 00:57:14,719 number of things we're doing on a 1655 00:57:14,719 --> 00:57:16,997 variety of fronts to get to that point . 1656 00:57:16,997 --> 00:57:18,941 And again we have I have , ah , 10 1657 00:57:18,941 --> 00:57:20,941 point plan by which we're executing 1658 00:57:20,941 --> 00:57:22,997 that t ensure that we're prepared to 1659 00:57:22,997 --> 00:57:25,163 deal with the strategic threats we see 1660 00:57:25,163 --> 00:57:27,330 in the future . Ah , and again , those 1661 00:57:27,330 --> 00:57:29,219 long term adversaries being China 1662 00:57:29,219 --> 00:57:31,441 competitors , being China than Russia . 1663 00:57:32,330 --> 00:57:34,386 Are you concerned that even with the 1664 00:57:34,386 --> 00:57:37,280 existing pre Coben 19 benchmarks , 1665 00:57:37,580 --> 00:57:39,802 we're going to see a plateau ing of the 1666 00:57:39,802 --> 00:57:42,010 defense budget if that turns out to be 1667 00:57:42,010 --> 00:57:44,010 the case ? But saying we go through 1668 00:57:44,010 --> 00:57:47,480 Kobe 19 all the fiscal disruption to go 1669 00:57:47,480 --> 00:57:49,480 through the presidential election . 1670 00:57:49,480 --> 00:57:51,536 Whoever wins winds up still sticking 1671 00:57:51,536 --> 00:57:53,647 with more or less a flat budget going 1672 00:57:53,647 --> 00:57:55,758 forward because of some of the fiscal 1673 00:57:55,758 --> 00:57:57,869 concerns . Are there still smart ways 1674 00:57:57,869 --> 00:58:00,036 we can implement that national defense 1675 00:58:00,036 --> 00:58:02,091 strategy even though it's gonna be a 1676 00:58:02,091 --> 00:58:01,970 lot harder for you or your successor ? 1677 00:58:02,020 --> 00:58:04,131 Are there still natural ways that one 1678 00:58:04,131 --> 00:58:06,131 could imagine making economies that 1679 00:58:06,131 --> 00:58:08,242 could live within more or less a flat 1680 00:58:08,242 --> 00:58:10,131 top line ? Or is that essentially 1681 00:58:10,131 --> 00:58:12,409 incompatible with the national defense ? 1682 00:58:12,409 --> 00:58:14,520 Strategy is , you see it well , there 1683 00:58:14,520 --> 00:58:16,409 are things we can do that are not 1684 00:58:16,409 --> 00:58:18,631 budget dependent , if you will , unlike 1685 00:58:18,631 --> 00:58:20,890 modernizing the four . So , first of 1686 00:58:20,890 --> 00:58:22,890 all , I think we've got to continue 1687 00:58:22,890 --> 00:58:25,112 doing what what I started last summer . 1688 00:58:25,112 --> 00:58:27,223 Defense Wide reviews and I came in in 1689 00:58:27,223 --> 00:58:29,279 late July early August , and we were 1690 00:58:29,279 --> 00:58:31,279 able to find over a period of three 1691 00:58:31,279 --> 00:58:33,446 months , about $6 billion . I was able 1692 00:58:33,446 --> 00:58:35,334 to immediately put that back into 1693 00:58:35,334 --> 00:58:37,557 things likely Faherty . Some of our new 1694 00:58:37,557 --> 00:58:39,668 technologies and other things we need 1695 00:58:39,668 --> 00:58:41,834 to modernize the force , but there are 1696 00:58:41,834 --> 00:58:43,723 things we can do again that don't 1697 00:58:43,723 --> 00:58:45,890 require a lot of money that could help 1698 00:58:45,890 --> 00:58:48,112 us get to that . So I mentioned the new 1699 00:58:48,112 --> 00:58:50,223 joint warfighting concept . We're now 1700 00:58:50,223 --> 00:58:52,112 in the process of transition to a 1701 00:58:52,112 --> 00:58:54,057 concept called of readiness called 1702 00:58:54,057 --> 00:58:56,279 Where We Have Immediate Reaction forces 1703 00:58:56,279 --> 00:58:58,334 and contingency reaction forces . We 1704 00:58:58,334 --> 00:59:00,390 have a new directed readiness tables 1705 00:59:00,390 --> 00:59:02,612 were implementing the policy of dynamic 1706 00:59:02,612 --> 00:59:04,779 force employment . I want to move much 1707 00:59:04,779 --> 00:59:07,120 more toward operational deployments as 1708 00:59:07,120 --> 00:59:09,231 to as compared to permit Lee deployed 1709 00:59:09,231 --> 00:59:11,398 Ford forces . So there are a number of 1710 00:59:11,398 --> 00:59:13,009 things we can do to keep our 1711 00:59:13,009 --> 00:59:15,176 adversaries off balance to improve our 1712 00:59:15,176 --> 00:59:17,398 own readiness . At the same time , that 1713 00:59:17,398 --> 00:59:19,287 don't necessarily involve massive 1714 00:59:19,287 --> 00:59:21,398 infusions of dollars . That said , we 1715 00:59:21,398 --> 00:59:23,676 do need that sustained top line growth . 1716 00:59:23,676 --> 00:59:25,898 And if we don't , we're just gonna have 1717 00:59:25,898 --> 00:59:27,787 to accelerate the shedding of the 1718 00:59:27,787 --> 00:59:29,953 Legacy Force and turning those dollars 1719 00:59:29,953 --> 00:59:32,400 back into building the force we need in 1720 00:59:32,400 --> 00:59:34,456 the future . And every service needs 1721 00:59:34,456 --> 00:59:36,733 that look . We need a we need a larger , 1722 00:59:36,940 --> 00:59:40,070 more capable ah , maybe that it can 1723 00:59:40,070 --> 00:59:41,920 operate the can implement the 1724 00:59:41,920 --> 00:59:44,720 segregated leaf Audi across the seven 1725 00:59:44,720 --> 00:59:47,220 seas . We need to modernize , of course , 1726 00:59:47,220 --> 00:59:49,276 our Air Force and start thinking and 1727 00:59:49,276 --> 00:59:51,220 continue working on six generation 1728 00:59:51,220 --> 00:59:53,276 capabilities . The army needs toe of 1729 00:59:53,276 --> 00:59:55,850 course , transition out of the Reagan 1730 00:59:55,850 --> 00:59:58,030 era Big Five and get into the next era 1731 00:59:58,030 --> 01:00:00,530 of Big Five that will be necessary for 1732 01:00:00,530 --> 01:00:02,363 high intensity , conflict , high 1733 01:00:02,363 --> 01:00:04,530 intensity conflict . And , of course , 1734 01:00:04,530 --> 01:00:06,474 the Marines were doing some really 1735 01:00:06,474 --> 01:00:05,940 innovative things with regard to how 1736 01:00:05,940 --> 01:00:08,107 they are adjusting their force . And I 1737 01:00:08,107 --> 01:00:10,329 think they have a pretty good blueprint 1738 01:00:10,329 --> 01:00:12,440 to do that . So all those things need 1739 01:00:12,440 --> 01:00:11,810 to continue . That just means we're 1740 01:00:11,810 --> 01:00:15,110 gonna shed the legacy for more quickly . 1741 01:00:15,350 --> 01:00:17,350 There may be things we need to stop 1742 01:00:17,350 --> 01:00:19,640 doing in order to free up dollars and 1743 01:00:19,640 --> 01:00:22,600 ah , but the same time weaken their 1744 01:00:22,610 --> 01:00:25,670 policy things , uh , adjustments we can 1745 01:00:25,670 --> 01:00:27,860 make in our training . Relying more on 1746 01:00:27,860 --> 01:00:30,082 our allies and partners to make sure we 1747 01:00:30,082 --> 01:00:32,304 can get to that future in state we want 1748 01:00:32,304 --> 01:00:35,150 on time . Mr . Secretary , we're lucky 1749 01:00:35,160 --> 01:00:37,327 as a country to have you in that job . 1750 01:00:37,327 --> 01:00:39,327 We're grateful at Brookings for the 1751 01:00:39,327 --> 01:00:41,382 time you spent with us today , Thank 1752 01:00:41,382 --> 01:00:41,280 you very much . And very best wishes 1753 01:00:41,280 --> 01:00:43,391 going forward . Thank you very much , 1754 01:00:43,391 --> 01:00:45,224 Michael . Thanks for your paying 1755 01:00:45,224 --> 01:00:47,280 attention . These important topics . 1756 01:00:47,280 --> 01:00:49,447 And thanks for what Brookings does our 1757 01:00:49,447 --> 01:00:49,170 pleasure . Best wishes to you . Best 1758 01:00:49,170 --> 01:00:49,860 wishes to all